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Article 
Fighting Women: The Military, Sex, and 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Change 
Jill Elaine Hasday† 
INTRODUCTION 
Americans often celebrate military service as a badge of 
honor and an emblem of full citizenship. Though potentially 
dangerous and difficult, even brief service in the armed forces 
offers valuable training, employment benefits, and reputational 
advantages, opening doors to civilian careers. Yet for genera-
tions Congress, the executive branch, the military, and the 
courts denied women equal access to the benefits and burdens 
of military service. Laws requiring men to register for possible 
conscription excluded women. Men could serve in combat, but 
women could not. Men could rise through the ranks, but the 
military relegated women to lower-status positions. Men could 
simultaneously be soldiers and fathers, but military service and 
motherhood were generally deemed incompatible. Underlying 
this regime of separate status was a pervasive belief that wom-
en’s true responsibilities were domestic and precluded full par-
ticipation in public life, including military service.1 
Some of the most important historical restrictions on wom-
en’s military role persist: women are still excluded from mili-
tary registration, draft eligibility, and some combat positions. 
These explicitly sex-based distinctions have become increasing-
ly anomalous over time. The rise of the modern women’s rights 
movement in the 1970s led legislatures and courts to repeal or 
 
†  Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School; Visiting Pro-
fessor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center (Fall 2008). B.A. 1994, J.D. 
1997, Yale University. I would like to thank Brian Bix, Allan Erbsen, Heidi 
Kitrosser, Melissa Murray, Reva Siegel, and the participants in faculty work-
shops at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, the University of Virgin-
ia School of Law, and the University of Akron School of Law Symposium on 
the New Face of Women’s Legal History. © 2008, Jill Elaine Hasday. 
 1. See infra Part I. 
 2008] FIGHTING WOMEN 97 
 
invalidate almost all laws subjecting men and women to expli-
citly different rules. Yet despite this wave of reform, Congress 
in 1980 rejected President Jimmy Carter’s proposal to register 
women with the Selective Service System.2 A year later, the 
Supreme Court held in Rostker v. Goldberg that male-only reg-
istration was consistent with equal protection, and also en-
dorsed male-only conscription and combat positions.3 Since 
Rostker, few court cases have challenged restrictions on wom-
en’s military service,4 and none have reached the Supreme 
Court. 
Notwithstanding the lack of judicial intervention, however, 
many aspects of women’s legal status in the military have 
changed in striking respects since Rostker ’s decision to protect 
the status quo. Congress, the executive branch, the military, 
and the public have become much more supportive of women’s 
military service, including in combat. The proportion of women 
in the active United States Armed Forces has risen from ap-
proximately 8.4% just before Rostker,5 to 14.6% in the most re-
cent statistics.6 Congress repealed the last statutory prohibi-
tion on women holding combat positions in 1993,7 and the 
military has opened a wide range of combat roles to women. 
Today, women serve—and die—in combat, as the present war 
in Iraq has amply demonstrated.8 Women are barred from an 
unprecedentedly small and steadily decreasing number of mili-
tary positions, and only by military regulation rather than sta-
tute.9 Public opinion surveys find markedly increased support 
for women’s military service, including in combat.10 
Legal scholars, whose agendas often track judicial dockets, 
have paid little attention to women’s legal status in the mili-
tary since Rostker, even when focusing on discrimination in the 
military. For example, scores of scholars have examined the So-
lomon Amendment, which requires institutions of higher edu-
 
 2. See infra text accompanying notes 71–104. 
 3. 453 U.S. 57, 75–77, 83 (1981). 
 4. See infra notes 155, 157–160 and accompanying text. 
 5. See OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF. (MANPOWER, RESERVE 
AFFAIRS, & LOGISTICS), BACKGROUND REVIEW: WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 13 
(1981). 
 6. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL AB-
STRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2008, at 332 tbl.498 (2007). 
 7. See infra text accompanying note 206. 
 8. See infra notes 225–230 and accompanying text. 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 209–224. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 231–243. 
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cation receiving certain federal funds to grant military recrui-
ters the same access to students that other recruiters enjoy.11 
Many scholars criticize the Amendment for pressuring schools 
to admit military recruiters when those schools otherwise ban 
recruiters who discriminate based on sexual orientation. Mili-
tary policies disfavoring gay servicemembers have been fre-
quently litigated, although repeatedly upheld,12 and they loom 
large in academic debates. Yet these same scholars routinely 
fail even to mention that military recruitment on campus might 
also violate school policies banning recruiters who discriminate 
based on sex.13 
This Article brings long overdue attention to the record of 
women’s legal status in the military in order to make three 
broad theoretical and historical points. First, the record of 
women’s legal status in the military is important counterevi-
dence to the prevalent assumption that sex equality already ex-
ists, at least in formal legal rules. Second, this record helps il-
luminate how extrajudicial events can shape the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional interpretation and then make that inter-
pretation much less plausible over time. Third, and most stri-
kingly, this record illustrates how extrajudicial actors can de-
velop and enforce their own evolving understanding of sex 
 
 11. See 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2006); see also Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 70 (2006) (holding that Solomon 
Amendment does not violate law schools’ First Amendment rights). 
 12. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 636 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Holmes v. Cal. Army Nat’l Guard, 124 F.3d 1126, 1127–28 (9th Cir. 1997); Ri-
chenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 258 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 
F.3d 915, 919 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 13. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grut-
ter: Getting Real About the “Four Freedoms” of a University, 77 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 929, 947–48 (2006) (“The Solomon Amendment requires universities to 
allow the military access to campus to recruit students, even though the mili-
tary violates a school’s policy prohibitting employer discrimination on the ba-
sis of sexual orientation, or face loss of federal funds.”); Clay Calvert & Robert 
D. Richards, Challenging the Wisdom of Solomon: The First Amendment and 
Military Recruitment on Campus, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 205, 211 (2004) 
(“[The Solomon Amendment] quickly became entangled with the burgeoning 
gay rights movement and non-discrimination policies, as many universities, 
both public and private, objected to the Pentagon’s anti-gay policies . . . . Those 
universities, in turn, banned military recruiters from campus because the mil-
itary discriminates based on sexual orientation.”). One Solomon Amendment 
defender notes that military recruitment on campus violates “law schools’ poli-
cies against discrimination based on age and disability,” but fails to mention 
sex discrimination. Gerald Walpin, The Solomon Amendment Is Constitutional 
and Does Not Violate Academic Freedom, 2 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 1, 9 
(2005). 
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equality norms, sometimes becoming a more important source 
of those norms than courts. The extrajudicial transformation in 
women’s military role has shifted the foundational normative 
commitments that shape the evolving meaning of constitutional 
equal protection. 
The Persistence of Legalized Sex Inequality. Women’s con-
tinued exclusion from registration, draft eligibility, and some 
combat positions contradicts any assumption that legalized sex 
inequality has faded into history.14 Indeed, Rostker illustrates 
how the notion that legalized sex inequality has been left in the 
past can facilitate the perpetuation of unequal regimes. In 
upholding male-only registration, Rostker asserted that Con-
gress rejected President Carter’s 1980 proposal to register 
women for entirely new and modern reasons untainted by invi-
dious sex stereotypes. The clear purpose of this contention—
which scholars have uncritically accepted—was to insist that 
any constitutionally problematic modes of reasoning about 
women were safely confined to the past, and to establish that 
women’s continued exclusion from registration was not a mark 
of second-class citizenship. In fact, this Article demonstrates—
contrary to current literature—that the record of Congress’s 
1980 decision to exclude women from registration is most nota-
ble for its consistency with earlier congressional decisions to re-
strict women’s military role that were rooted in the conviction 
that women’s familial responsibilities precluded their full par-
ticipation in public life. In 1980, political and popular forces—
on both sides of the debates over registering women—remained 
committed to restricting women’s military service on the belief 
that women’s real responsibilities were domestic and private 
rather than political and public.15 
The Court’s Constitutional Interpretation and the World 
Outside the Court. The record of women’s legal status in the 
military also illuminates the influence that extrajudicial forces 
can have on the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. The Rost-
ker Court explicitly grounded its decision to uphold male-only 
registration on congressional, executive, military, and popular 
opposition to women in combat.16 Rostker ’s interpretation of 
constitutional equal protection built upon a point of considera-
ble extrajudicial consensus—that women should not be in com-
 
 14. On this assumption in the family law context, see Jill Elaine Hasday, 
The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 833–70 (2004). 
 15. See infra Part I.A. 
 16. See infra text accompanying notes 151–154. 
 100 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:96 
 
bat—and staked a position on a point of intense extrajudicial 
disagreement—whether women’s exclusion from combat justi-
fied male-only registration and conscription eligibility.17 
Since Rostker, the record of women’s military status illu-
strates how extrajudicial developments can undermine the 
plausibility of the constitutional interpretation in the Court’s 
precedents. Without any constitutional amendment or reversal 
in the Court’s jurisprudence, Rostker ’s constitutional interpre-
tation has become much less compelling and convincing over 
time. Rostker ’s understanding of equal protection was not time-
less and ahistorical; it was inextricably intertwined with the 
factual premise that opposition to women’s combat service was 
widespread and the cultural assumption that this opposition 
was too reasonable to need explanation. As Congress, the ex-
ecutive branch, and the military are well aware, the extrajudi-
cial transformation in women’s military role since Rostker has 
seriously undercut the transitory premises and assumptions 
behind Rostker ’s interpretation of equal protection. This trans-
formation makes clear that Rostker is inconsistent with the rest 
of the Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence.18 
The influence that extrajudicial forces can exert on the 
Court’s constitutional interpretation has not gone unnoted,19 
 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part III.B. 
 19. Scholars, particularly outside the legal academy, have long observed 
that politics and popular culture could influence the Supreme Court. See, e.g., 
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 224 (1960) (“[T]he 
Court has seldom lagged far behind or forged far ahead of America.”). For ex-
ample, extrajudicial forces could influence the Court indirectly through the 
appointments process, in which Presidents nominate and Senators confirm 
Justices. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; sources cited infra note 143. Extra-
judicial forces could also directly influence Justices, perhaps because the same 
waves of evolving opinion that affect other Americans also affect the Justices 
or perhaps because Justices prefer deferring to popular or political sentiment 
out of respect for democratic processes or fear of retaliation. See BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921) (“The great tides 
and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, 
and pass the judges by.”). Some social scientists focus on documenting correla-
tions between the Court’s constitutional interpretation and public opinion 
polls. See sources cited infra note 150. The Court has occasionally acknowl-
edged the influence that changes in legislative and popular opinion exert on 
its constitutional jurisprudence, whether in adjudicating the Eighth Amend-
ment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S. CONST. amend. 
VIII; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005), determining if material is 
obscene and therefore outside First Amendment protection, Ashcroft v. Am. 
Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 574 (2002), or finding that criminalizing 
consensual sodomy violates the Due Process Clause, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
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but it is frequently forgotten or denied. Especially in recent 
years, the Court has more often insisted on its distance from 
extrajudicial influence. For instance, little ground united the 
majority and Justice Antonin Scalia’s opinion in Planned Pa-
renthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey except the con-
tention that what the majority characterized as “social and po-
litical pressures” would not and should not affect the Court’s 
constitutional judgments.20 “How upsetting it is,” Scalia agreed, 
“that so many of our citizens . . . think that we Justices should 
properly take into account their views.”21 
Legal scholars, too, often appear to write on the assump-
tion that knowledge and insight flow from courts to the society 
outside and not the reverse. The relatively few legal scholars to 
consider women’s military role since Rostker have focused on 
advising courts about the future direction of their jurispru-
dence.22 The most influential article in this tradition concludes 
by encouraging courts to invalidate discrimination in the mili-
tary, explaining “our judges can teach their fellow Americans 
the vital lesson that we are one nation, indivisible.”23 In fact, 
the record of women’s military status reveals extrajudicial ac-
tors advancing a vision of equality that is farther-reaching and 
more inclusive than the judiciary’s, and that offers courts po-
tential lessons. 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Change. While the existing le-
gal scholarship on women’s military role is oriented toward the 
judiciary, courts actually have not been central to the trans-
formation of women’s military service since Rostker. Rostker 
found male-only registration, conscription, and combat consis-
tent with equal protection, creating no pressure for change. 
Congress, the executive branch, and the military have dramati-
cally altered women’s military role since Rostker through 
processes in which courts have been remarkably marginal. 
 
U.S. 558, 579 (2003). 
 20. 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992). 
 21. Id. at 999–1000 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 22. See, e.g., Marilyn A. Gordon & Mary Jo Ludvigson, The Combat Exclu-
sion for Women Aviators: A Constitutional Analysis, 39 NAVAL L. REV. 171, 
175–85 (1990); Karla R. Kelly, The Exclusion of Women from Combat: With-
standing the Challenge, 33 JAG J. 77, 87–108 (1984); Valorie K. Vojdik, 
Beyond Stereotyping in Equal Protection Doctrine: Reframing the Exclusion of 
Women from Combat, 57 ALA. L. REV. 303, 332–49 (2005). 
 23. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of 
the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 581 (1991) (emphasis added). 
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Commentators often praise the Court’s ability to settle 
constitutional disputes,24 but Rostker ’s judgment that women’s 
rights to equality were not at risk did not stop Congress, the 
executive, and the military from debating the issue, or enforc-
ing their own evolving judgment that sex equality, along with 
the volunteer military’s personnel needs, called for granting 
women an increasingly large military role, including in combat. 
Women’s military role has expanded despite Rostker because 
the Court is not the only institution committed to sex equality, 
actively considering how to advance that commitment, or will-
ing and able to enforce its judgments. 
The record of women’s legal status in the military demon-
strates how equality norms can change, and find legal enforce-
ment, without any change in Court jurisprudence or any Court 
involvement. The claim that restrictions on women’s military 
role impinged upon sex equality moved from the Court to other 
parts of government, and was enforced there. Extrajudicial ac-
tors have developed and enforced their own evolving under-
standing of sex equality norms.25 
One pressing question this record raises is whether the 
extrajudicial transformation in women’s military role since 
Rostker should be understood as constitutional change.26 An 
emerging legal literature explores extrajudicial constitutional 
change. But this literature has focused on the courts’ power to 
invalidate or constrain government action, and the extent to 
which extrajudicial institutions can, should, or do resist exer-
tions of that judicial power.27 Rostker upheld and placed no re-
strictions upon government activity, yet the extrajudicial trans-
formation in women’s military status is contrary to Rostker ’s 
reasoning, premises, and expectations. This transformation 
highlights a question on which the literature about extrajudi-
cial constitutional change has not adequately focused: what 
counts as constitutional change outside the courts? The record 
of women’s legal status in the military illustrates how the an-
swer to that question depends on the purposes for which it is 
being asked. 
The transformation in women’s military status does not 
count as constitutional change if the question is meant to estab-
lish whether courts would have ordered this transformation if 
 
 24. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 25. See infra Part III.A. 
 26. See infra Part IV. 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 254–258. 
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Congress, the executive, and the military had not acted. The 
transformation also does not count as constitutional change if 
the question is meant to establish whether Congress, the ex-
ecutive, and the military stated that they were constitutionally 
obligated to make the changes they made. 
But the transformation in women’s military status does 
count as constitutional change if the question seeks to under-
stand the foundational normative commitments that shape the 
meaning of constitutional equal protection as it evolves. This 
transformation has made limits on women’s military service 
that seemed just and reasonable in the 1970s and 1980s to 
many people determined to establish sex equality in constitu-
tional and statutory law, now appear wrong, inequitable, and 
even invidious. Over time, that shift in perspective is likely to 
affect the demands for further change and the judgments made 
about how the Constitution’s open-textured language of equal 
protection applies to specific questions about women’s military 
role. 
The courts’ constitutional jurisprudence is one place this 
shift in perspective might register. The transformation in wom-
en’s military status has undermined Rostker ’s foundation, mak-
ing restrictions on women’s military service that Rostker did 
not explain because they seemed so commonsensical now de-
mand explanation and appear constitutionally vulnerable. 
However, given the judiciary’s frequent underenforcement 
of constitutional rights in the military arena, the shift in pers-
pective is likely to be most important—at least in the short 
term—in shaping the constitutional arguments that can be di-
rected to extrajudicial actors. The claim that limits on women’s 
military service are inconsistent with constitutional equal pro-
tection has become a much more cognizable, even powerful, 
claim to make before Congress, the executive, and the military. 
In the coming years—as the transformation in women’s mili-
tary role continues to destabilize understandings of which ar-
rangements are reasonable and which wrong—Congress, the 
executive, and the military will be pushed to decide what addi-
tional changes in women’s military service to enact in the in-
terest of constitutional equal protection. 
The Article concludes by exploring some of the practical 
consequences of the extrajudicial shift in perspective on wom-
en’s military service. As Congress, the executive, the military, 
and the public increasingly recognize women’s military service, 
including in combat, as a natural expression and reflection of 
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women’s equality, male-only registration, draft eligibility, and 
combat positions become more difficult for extrajudicial deci-
sionmakers to defend and sustain as consistent with constitu-
tional norms of sex equality. To be sure, some members of Con-
gress, the executive, the military, and the public remain 
resistant to further change, or eager to avoid issues for as long 
as possible, so sex-based restrictions on women’s military ser-
vice may not end overnight. In the near term, however, the 
extrajudicial shift in perspective on women’s military service, 
combined with the near absence of judicial review over women’s 
legal status in the military since Rostker, provide the founda-
tion for a strong argument that Congress, the executive, and 
the military should assume a heightened responsibility to re-
view and oversee military decisions about which positions will 
be closed to women to ensure their rationality, freedom from 
bias, and consistency with constitutional norms of sex equality. 
This shift in perspective and absence of judicial review also 
provide the basis for a strong argument that Congress, the ex-
ecutive, and the military should assume in the interest of con-
stitutional norms of sex equality a heightened responsibility to 
review and oversee facially sex-neutral military policies that 
disproportionately hamper servicewomen’s opportunities. 
Let’s turn to the record of women’s legal status in the mili-
tary, starting before Rostker. 
I. MILITARY SERVICE, CITIZENSHIP, AND DOMESTICITY: 
WOMEN AND THE MILITARY BEFORE ROSTKER 
Military service represents a complex mix of benefit and 
burden. The ratio of benefits and burdens varies depending on 
whether one is a volunteer or conscript. But both volunteers 
and draftees share some obvious burdens, like time away from 
civilian pursuits and risk to life and limb. The benefits of mili-
tary service are also striking. They include concrete material 
advantages, such as vocational training and extensive veterans’ 
benefits and preferences.28 
Another critical benefit is cultural and political: Americans 
have long understood military service to be a central avenue for 
establishing and confirming full citizenship. Ten of the first 
thirty-three Presidents were military generals.29 Overall, twen-
 
 28. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 261 (1979) (“The Feder-
al Government and virtually all of the States grant some sort of hiring prefe-
rence to veterans.”). 
 29. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE 
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ty-eight Presidents served in America’s armed forces.30 
Courts have stressed the connection between military ser-
vice and full citizenship in cases upholding conscription from 
World War I to the Vietnam era. They have explained that mil-
itary service is the citizen’s “supreme and noble duty,”31 adding 
“that the very conception of a just government and its duty to 
the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to 
render military service in case of need and the right to compel 
it.”32 In Scott v. Sandford, which held that black people were 
not American citizens,33 the Supreme Court cited as important 
evidence a state law limiting military service to “free white citi-
zens.” As the Court reasoned, “[n]othing could more strongly 
mark the entire repudiation of the African race.” A member of 
“the African race” “is not, by the institutions and laws of the 
State, numbered among its people. He forms no part of the so-
vereignty of the State, and is not therefore called on to uphold 
and defend it.”34 
Discussions of military service and full citizenship have 
historically made little, if any, mention of whether women were 
full citizens. In fact, women’s military service was severely re-
stricted historically in order to express and enforce the convic-
tion that women’s special domestic responsibilities precluded 
full participation in public roles. Women did not gain perma-
nent status in the military until 1948,35 and the operative sta-
 
THEORY AND POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 157 (1957). 
 30. See JOSEPH NATHAN KANE ET AL., FACTS ABOUT THE PRESIDENTS: A 
COMPILATION OF BIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL INFORMATION 589 (7th ed. 
2001). 
 31. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 390 (1918). 
 32. Id. at 378; see also United States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621, 622–23 (7th 
Cir. 1969) (quoting this passage from Selective Draft Law Cases). 
 33. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404–07 (1857). 
 34. Id. at 415. 
 35. See Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 
80-625, 62 Stat. 356. During World War II, women in the military served on a 
temporary basis. See Act of May 14, 1942, ch. 312, 56 Stat. 278 (Women’s Ar-
my Auxiliary Corps); Act of July 30, 1942, ch. 538, 56 Stat. 730 (Navy Wom-
en’s Reserve). However, the government did seriously consider drafting female 
nurses. In a January 6, 1945 message to Congress, President Franklin Roose-
velt “‘urge[d] that the Selective Service Act be amended to provide for the in-
duction of nurses into the armed forces,’” explaining that “‘[t]he need is too 
pressing to await the outcome of further efforts at recruiting.’” H.R. REP. NO. 
79-194, at 2 (1945). On February 22, 1945, the House Military Affairs Com-
mittee recommended the Nurses Selective Service Act, which would have con-
scripted female nurses. See id. at 1. The committee explained that there was 
“a large group of female citizens who [were] registered nurses,” and “these 
nurses [could not] be obtained in sufficient numbers within the time needed 
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tute—the misleadingly named Women’s Armed Services Inte-
gration Act—capped women’s participation at a maximum of 
two percent of the military;36 excluded women from registra-
tion, conscription, upper officer ranks,37 and combat positions;38 
and permitted involuntarily discharge for motherhood or preg-
nancy.39 The Integration Act’s supporters insisted that women’s 
ultimate responsibilities were familial. General Dwight D. Ei-
senhower assured Congress that “few” women would accumu-
late the thirty years of military service necessary for earning 
retirement benefits. Instead, women “will come in and I believe 
after an enlistment or two enlistments they will ordinarily—
and thank God—they will get married.”40 Rear Admiral T.L. 
 
except through selective service legislation.” Id. at 6. The bill passed the 
House, and the Senate Military Affairs Committee recommended it on March 
28, 1945. See S. REP. NO. 79-130, at 1 (1945). But the bill lost momentum after 
the war in Europe ended in May 1945. It is now little-known, even among his-
torians. See Linda K. Kerber, “A Constitutional Right to be Treated Like . . . 
Ladies”: Women, Civic Obligation and Military Service, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 95, 109 (“Although the idea of the citizen-soldier was vigorously 
deployed in discussions of the World War II draft, no serious efforts were made 
to draft women, even for non-combatant service in the women’s auxiliary 
forces (e.g. WACS, WAVES), or as nurses.”). 
 36. See Women’s Armed Services Integration Act § 102 (Army); id. § 202 
(Navy); id. § 213(b) (Marines); id. § 302 (Air Force). 
 37. Only one Army woman could serve as a colonel, and that was a tempo-
rary rank limited to her tenure as director of the Women’s Army Corps, see id. 
§ 103(a), the separate corps for Army women, see id. § 101. Only one woman in 
the Air Force and one female Marine could have the temporary rank of colonel. 
See id. § 303(g) (Air Force); id. § 213(d) (Marines). Only one Navy woman 
could have the temporary rank of captain. See id. § 205. 
 38. Women in the Air Force and the Navy (which includes the Marines) 
could not be assigned to duty on aircraft engaged in combat missions, see id. 
§ 307(a) (Air Force); id. §§ 210, 212 (Navy), and Navy women could not be as-
signed to Navy vessels except for hospital ships and naval transports, see id. 
§§ 210, 212. The Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy could further limit 
women’s assignments. See id. § 307(a) (Air Force); id. §§ 210, 212 (Navy). 
There were no explicit exemptions for Army women. The Secretary of the Ar-
my had complete discretion, see id. § 104(g), on the understanding that defin-
ing the scope of the Army combat exclusion was more difficult, see Women’s 
Armed Services Integration Act of 1947: Hearings on S. 1103, S. 1527, and S. 
1641 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 80th Cong. 88 (1947) (statement 
of Colonel Mary Hallaren, Director, Women’s Army Corps). 
 39. The service secretaries had full discretion to discharge women, as long 
as the secretaries complied with any presidential regulations. See Women’s 
Armed Services Integration Act §§ 104(h), 105(b), 106(b) (Army); § 214 (Navy 
and Marines); § 307(b) (Air Force). As anticipated, President Harry Truman’s 
1951 executive order provided that the secretaries could discharge servicewo-
men for motherhood or pregnancy. See Exec. Order No. 10,240, 3 C.F.R. 749, 
749 (1949–1953). 
 40. To Establish the Women’s Army Corps in the Regular Army, to Author-
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Sprague explained that the military would involuntarily dis-
charge pregnant servicewomen because “under those circums-
tances, a woman’s loyalty and duty are to her family and no 
longer to the service.”41 
Women’s military status remained essentially unchanged 
for decades, with women constituting approximately one per-
cent of the military.42 A 1957 recruiting pamphlet documented 
the military’s commitment to preserving civilian social and 
economic patterns. The pamphlet included two drawings side-
by-side, each picturing a working woman. The only difference 
was that the first woman was wearing civilian clothes, and the 
second was in military uniform. Each was sitting before the 
same typewriter, with the same expression on her face, appar-
ently doing the same work.43  
 
 
 Fig. 1. 
 
ize the Enlistment and Appointment of Women in the Regular Navy and Ma-
rine Corps and the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve, and for Other Purposes: 
Hearings on S. 1641 Before the Subcomm. on Organization and Mobilization of 
the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 80th Cong. 5564 (1948) (statement of Gener-
al Dwight D. Eisenhower). 
 41. Women’s Armed Services Integration Act of 1947: Hearings on S. 1103, 
S. 1527, and S. 1641 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, supra note 38, at 
67 (statement of Rear Admiral T.L. Sprague, Chief of Naval Personnel). 
 42. See On Military Posture and Department of Defense Authorization for 
Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979 Also Assignment of Women on Navy Ships: 
Hearings on H.R. 10,929 and H.R. 7431 Before the H. Comm. on Armed Servic-
es, 95th Cong., pt. 5, at 195 (1978) (statement of John P. White, Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics); CENT. ALL-
VOLUNTEER FORCE TASK FORCE, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF. 
(MANPOWER & RESERVE AFFAIRS), UTILIZATION OF MILITARY WOMEN: A RE-
PORT OF INCREASED UTILIZATION OF MILITARY WOMEN FY 1973–1977, at vi 
(1972); OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF. (MANPOWER, RESERVE AF-
FAIRS, & LOGISTICS), supra note 5, at 12. 
 43. See DEP’T OF DEF., CAREERS FOR WOMEN IN THE ARMED FORCES 18 
(1957). 
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By the early 1970s, however, women’s legal status in the 
military had begun to attract unprecedented attention for two 
reasons. First, the modern women’s rights movement, which 
challenged the social and legal norms confining women to nar-
row roles in the family and workplace, had emerged as a power-
ful social movement and sparked the mobilization of an oppos-
ing movement intent on preserving women’s existing roles, 
especially in the family. Second, the end of the draft in 1973 
made the military more eager to attract women.44 The military 
progressively increased its recruitment of women in the 1970s, 
citing the demands of the women’s movement and the need for 
more military volunteers given the abolition of the draft.45 
The first decade of modern political and popular debates 
about women’s military role focused on the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) and President Carter’s 1980 proposal to im-
plement by statute and military regulation what many ERA 
supporters contended the Amendment would establish: wom-
en’s inclusion in registration and conscription eligibility, and 
continued exclusion from combat. These debates were tightly 
 
 44. For the statute ending the draft as of July 1, 1973, see Act of Sept. 28, 
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-129, § 101(a)(35), 85 Stat. 348, 353 (codified at 50 U.S.C. 
app. § 467(c) (2000)). 
 45. See CENT. ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE TASK FORCE, supra note 42, at i–ii 
(“The Central All-Volunteer Force Task Force was asked to study the utiliza-
tion of military women and prepare contingency plans for increasing the use of 
women to offset possible shortages of male recruits after the end of the 
draft. . . . Shortly after this study commenced, the Equal Rights Amendment 
was passed by Congress on March 22, 1972. . . . This Amendment brought the 
focus of the nation upon equal rights for women, and the Defense Department 
intensified its efforts ‘to make Military and Civilian service in the Department 
of Defense a model of equal opportunity . . . .’ During the course of the 
study, . . . Navy and Air Force announced plans to increase significantly the 
number of military women during FY 1973–1977, and the Marine Corps ad-
vised the Task Force that it planned a modest increase.” (footnote omitted)); 
COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., JOB OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN IN THE 
MILITARY: PROGRESS AND PROBLEMS, at i (1976) (“The draft was to end. Fewer 
men were expected to join the services. Equal Rights Amendment require-
ments were expected. This was the milieu in 1972 when the Department of 
Defense started recruiting more women and using them in as many jobs as 
possible within combat limitations, including those previously restricted to 
men.”); OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF. (MANPOWER, RESERVE AF-
FAIRS, & LOGISTICS), BACKGROUND STUDY: USE OF WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 1 
(2d ed. 1978) (“[T]he use of women in the military is a question of increasing 
importance, for two reasons. First is the movement within the society to pro-
vide equal economic opportunity for American women. Second, and more im-
portant, use of more women can be a significant factor in making the all-
volunteer force continue to work in the face of a declining youth population.”). 
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intertwined, although the Rostker Court and scholars repeating 
Rostker ’s account later sought to separate them. 
Throughout these debates, powerful forces in government 
and popular culture remained determined to limit women’s mil-
itary service in the interest of confirming and enforcing the 
conviction that women’s real responsibilities were domestic and 
private. There was a strong consensus against including wom-
en in combat. There was more dispute over whether women 
should register and be eligible for conscription. But many 
people who supported including women in registration and con-
scription did so on the belief that Congress and the military 
would organize any draft to preserve women’s existing roles in 
the family and workplace. Even so, efforts to include women in 
registration and conscription failed. 
A. GOVERNMENTAL AND POPULAR DEBATES ABOUT WOMEN’S 
LEGAL STATUS IN THE MILITARY, 1970–1980 
The modern women’s movement was intent on amending 
the Constitution to provide that “[e]quality of rights under the 
law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by 
any State on account of sex.”46 By 1970, Congress was also fo-
cused on the ERA. In the extensive congressional debates and 
testimony on the Amendment, all ERA opponents,47 and vir-
tually all ERA supporters,48 agreed that the Amendment would 
 
 46. Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, H.R.J. 
Res. 208, 92d Cong., § 1, 86 Stat. 1523, 1523 (1972). 
 47. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 9100 (1972) (statement of Senator Samuel 
Ervin, Jr.) (“Since one of the obligations that our society imposes upon men is 
to serve in the Armed Forces, even if one is unwilling to volunteer and to serve 
in combat, this amendment would require that men and women be drafted on 
exactly the same conditions and serve in combat units and all other units of 
the Armed Forces under exactly the same conditions.”); id. at 9317 (statement 
of Senator John Stennis) (“Under the resolution as it now stands no man in 
the United States could be drafted into the Army unless women were equally 
subject to the draft. . . . [I]f we adopt the resolution without amendment, . . . 
the U.S. Army would not be allowed to exclude women from combat or other 
hazardous duty on the basis of sex, since that would discriminate against men, 
and the present resolution requires absolute sameness of treatment regardless 
of sex.”). 
 48. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 92-689, at 13 (1972) (“It seems likely as well that 
the ERA will require Congress to treat men and women equally with respect 
to the draft.”). William Van Alstyne was one of the very few ERA supporters 
who argued that the Amendment would not necessarily require sex-neutral 
rules governing registration, conscription, and combat. He considered “the de-
ference the Supreme Court has placed with Congress with regard to matters of 
national security,” and concluded that the Court would uphold women’s exclu-
sion from “combatant training and service,” even with the ERA in the Consti-
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require sex-neutral rules governing registration, conscription, 
and combat service. 
The charge that the ERA would compel women’s inclusion 
in registration, conscription, and combat was a leading objec-
tion, perhaps the foremost objection, to the Amendment. ERA 
opponents repeatedly proposed substitute amendments stating 
that the sex discrimination prohibition would “‘not impair, 
however, the validity of any law of the United States or any 
State which exempts women from compulsory military ser-
vice.’”49 
These opponents stressed that including women, especially 
mothers, in registration, conscription, and combat would de-
stroy family life by removing the person obligated to maintain 
it. Senator Samuel Ervin, Jr. stated bluntly that women’s re-
sponsibilities were domestic and private rather than political 
and public. He explained that “custom and law” had always 
held wives and mothers responsible for making “homes” and 
furnishing “nurture, care, and training to their children during 
their early years.”50 “It is absolutely ridiculous to talk about 
taking a mother away from her children so that she may go out 
to fight the enemy and leave the father at home to nurse the 
children.”51 Representative Emanuel Celler affirmed that wom-
en’s real responsibilities were familial. “Women represent mo-
therhood and creation,” he declared. “Wars are for destruc-
tion.”52 Representative David Dennis elaborated that American 
society’s foundation depended on preserving women’s family 
roles. He warned that “the drafting of American women and 
mothers into the military service is a thoroughly undesirable 
social development which would go far, indeed, to transform us 
into a national socialist state.”53 
 
tution. Equal Rights Amendment Extension: Hearings on H.J. Res. 638 Before 
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 95th Cong. 150 (1978) (statement of William Van Alstyne, Marshall-
Wythe School of Law, College of William and Mary). 
 49. E.g., 116 CONG. REC. 29,671 (1970) (statement of Senator Samuel Er-
vin, Jr.). 
 50. S. REP. NO. 92-689, at 49 (Minority Views of Mr. Ervin). 
 51. 118 CONG. REC. 9102 (1972) (statement of Senator Samuel Ervin, Jr.). 
 52. 117 CONG. REC. 35,785 (1971) (statement of Representative Emanuel 
Celler). 
 53. Id. at 35,316 (statement of Representative David Dennis). Opponents 
of women’s equality have long attempted to discredit both feminism and so-
cialism by linking them together as movements meant to undermine women’s 
family roles. See, e.g., B.V. HUBBARD, SOCIALISM, FEMINISM, AND SUFFRAGISM, 
THE TERRIBLE TRIPLETS: CONNECTED BY THE SAME UMBILICAL CORD, AND FED 
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ERA supporters offered two sorts of responses. Some ERA 
supporters directly contested the premises of ERA opponents. 
They challenged women’s circumscribed role in the military as 
part of their larger challenge to women’s circumscribed role in 
the family, workplace, and society as a whole. These ERA sup-
porters rejected the “understanding among people that women 
are not to serve their country, that women are to serve individ-
uals—that is, husbands and families.”54 They stressed the ben-
efits of military service—leadership opportunities, vocational 
training, educational scholarships, and job preferences for vet-
erans—that would help women surmount the constraints they 
typically confronted in the workplace.55 They insisted that 
women should assume equal responsibility for national defense 
to establish and confirm their equal citizenship. Representative 
Bella Abzug observed that “[i]n the Congress of the United 
States and in the political life of this Nation, political choices 
and debate often reflect a belief that men who have fought for 
their country have a special right to wield political power and 
make political decisions.” Until women had equal rights and re-
sponsibilities with respect to military service, they would be 
“denied the status of full citizenship, and the respect that goes 
with that status.”56 
However, many ERA supporters offered arguments much 
more closely aligned with the premises of ERA opponents. 
These ERA supporters belie standard scholarly accounts stress-
 
FROM THE SAME NURSING BOTTLE 286 (1915) (“Socialism, Feminism and Suf-
fragism are triplets. . . . All three isms are intent on breaking down the Chris-
tian family as a unit, and the making of individuals of each member. All disre-
gard the teachings of Scripture in regard to the relative duties of husband and 
wife.”); WOMAN PATRIOT, Apr. 27, 1918, at 1 (“A National Newspaper For 
Home and National Defense Against Woman Suffrage, Feminism and Social-
ism”). 
 54. Equal Rights for Men and Women 1971: Hearings on H.J. Res. 35, 208, 
and Related Bills and H.R. 916 and Related Bills Before Subcomm. No. 4 of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 99 (1971) (statement of Jean Faust, 
Assistant on Women’s Rights for Representative William F. Ryan). 
 55. See, e.g., id. at 131–32 (statement of Virginia R. Allan, Former Chair-
man, President’s Task Force on Women’s Rights and Responsibilities); The 
“Equal Rights” Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 61 Before the Subcomm. on 
Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 75 
(1970) (statement of Jean Witter, Chairman, Equal Rights Amendment Com-
mittee, National Organization for Women); 117 CONG. REC. 35,311 (1971) 
(statement of Representative Bella Abzug). 
 56. 117 CONG. REC. 35,311 (1971) (statement of Representative Bella Ab-
zug). 
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ing the radicalism of Amendment advocates.57 Instead, these 
ERA supporters appeared to be significantly attached to pre-
serving women’s social roles, within and outside the military. 
They either felt such commitments themselves, or were con-
vinced that the Amendment would fail unless taken to be con-
sistent with such commitments, or both. 
These ERA supporters denied that the Amendment would 
cause as much change as opponents predicted. For instance, 
they conceded that the ERA would make women eligible for 
conscription, but explained that Congress and the military 
would structure any draft to preserve women’s domestic roles. 
Mothers would be exempt, and this would not violate the ERA 
if fathers with the same family responsibilities were also ex-
empt. The Senate Judiciary Committee promised that “the fear 
that mothers will be conscripted from their children into mili-
tary service if the Equal Rights Amendment is ratified is totally 
and completely unfounded. Congress will retain ample power to 
create legitimate sex-neutral exemptions from compulsory ser-
vice.”58 
These ERA supporters also opposed including women in 
combat. They argued that the Amendment would permit Con-
gress and the military to restrict combat service to people fitted 
for such service, and assumed this would preclude women from 
actually assuming combat roles. Senator Edward Gurney 
stated flatly that “the amendment does not require that women 
become combatants in the Armed Forces although it will sub-
ject them to the draft.”59 Representative Michael Harrington 
explained that “the principle that members of the Armed 
Forces are used according to their basic ability alleviates the 
possibility that women will be sent into combat.”60 Representa-
 
 57. Jane Mansbridge, for instance, has emphasized that “[b]ecause ERA 
activists had little of an immediate, practical nature to lose if the ERA was de-
feated, they had little reason to describe it in a way that would make it ac-
ceptable to middle-of-the-road legislators.” JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE 
LOST THE ERA 2 (1986). “Most proponents contended, for example, that the 
ERA would require the military to send women draftees into combat on the 
same basis as men.” Id. at 3; see also Edith Mayo & Jerry K. Frye, The ERA: 
Postmortem of a Failure in Political Communication, in RIGHTS OF PASSAGE: 
THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE ERA 76, 84 (Joan Hoff-Wilson ed., 1986) (“Such 
strident feminist rhetoric was typical of the women’s movement’s failure to 
construct persuasive answers to the draft for a general, nonfeminist public.”). 
 58. S. REP. NO. 92-689, at 13 (1972). 
 59. 118 CONG. REC. 9336 (1972) (statement of Senator Edward Gurney). 
 60. 117 CONG. REC. 35,325 (1971) (statement of Representative Michael 
Harrington). 
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tive Martha Griffiths, the ERA’s chief House sponsor, confi-
dently predicted that the Amendment would leave servicewo-
men in the same low-level clerical and administrative jobs 
women dominated in civilian life and had long been confined to 
in the military. “The draft itself is equal,” she stated. “But once 
you are in the Army you are put where the Army tells you 
where you are going to go. The thing that will happen with 
women is that they will be the stenographers and telephone op-
erators.”61 
The ERA passed the House on October 12, 1971,62 and the 
Senate on March 22, 1972.63 But the charge that the Amend-
ment would transform women’s military status, and so trans-
form women’s domestic status, raged in state ratification de-
bates.64 
By 1978, the ERA’s ratification deadline (March 22, 1979) 
was approaching, and only thirty-five of the required thirty-
eight states had ratified.65 During the intense congressional 
debates over whether to extend the deadline, ERA opponents 
reiterated that the Amendment would undermine women’s 
family roles by subjecting women to registration, conscription, 
and combat,66 and identified the ERA’s implications for wom-
 
 61. Id. at 35,323 (statement of Representative Martha Griffiths). 
 62. See id. at 35,815. 
 63. See 118 CONG. REC. 9598 (1972). 
 64. An ERA opponent in the Illinois House of Representatives, for in-
stance, contended that the United States House “Judiciary Committee said 
that this would mean that women and this includes mothers, would be subject 
to the draft and the military would be compelled to place them in combat units 
along side of men. . . . [T]his is the Judiciary Committee that has drafted many 
many Constitutional Amendments.” House of Representatives, State of Illinois 
General Assembly 104 (Apr. 4, 1973) (on file with author) (statement of Repre-
sentative Donald Deuster); see also Connecticut Committee to Rescind ERA, 
Don’t Let the Equal Rights Amendment Stamp Out Womanhood, reprinted in 
Equal Rights Amendment Extension: Hearings on S.J. Res. 134 Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 
142, 143 (1979) (statement of Thomas I. Emerson, Lines Professor of Law 
Emeritus, Yale Law School) (“ERA will make women subject to the draft on an 
equal basis with men in all our future wars. ERA will make women and moth-
ers subject to military combat and warship duty.”). 
 65. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, 
Utah, and Virginia had not ratified the ERA by 1978 and never would. See 
MANSBRIDGE, supra note 57, at 13–14 (“All were Mormon or southern states, 
except Illinois, which required a three-fifths majority for ratifying constitu-
tional amendments and which had a strongly southern culture in the third of 
the state surrounded by Missouri and Kentucky.”). 
 66. See, e.g., Equal Rights Amendment Extension: Hearings on S.J. Res. 
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en’s military service as “probably the most serious” obstacle to 
ratification.67 ERA supporters again conceded that the 
Amendment would require women’s inclusion in registration 
and conscription, but explained that Congress and the military 
would organize any draft to protect women’s existing family 
roles and would exclude women from combat.68 On October 6, 
1978, Congress extended the ratification deadline until June 
30, 1982.69 But the debate over the ERA’s consequences for 
women’s military service continued within and outside Con-
gress.70 
In the midst of this debate, President Carter, a leading 
ERA advocate,71 sought to implement by statute and regulation 
the changes in women’s military role that many ERA suppor-
ters contended the Amendment would achieve. On February 8, 
1980, Carter announced that he would seek congressional au-
thorization to reinstitute registration and register women along 
with men,72 but stressed his opposition to including women in 
combat positions.73 
 
134 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
supra note 64, at 352, 354 (statement of Senator Orrin Hatch). 
 67. Equal Rights Amendment Extension: Hearings on H.J. Res. 638 Before 
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, supra note 48, at 113 (statement of Erwin N. Griswold, former Solicitor 
General of the United States). 
 68. See, e.g., id. at 348–49 (statement of Frankie M. Freeman, Commis-
sioner, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights); Equal Rights Amendment Extension: 
Hearings on S.J. Res. 134 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 64, at 281, 345–47 (statement of Senator 
Birch Bayh). 
 69. H.R.J. Res. 638, 95th Cong., 92 Stat. 3799 (1978). 
 70. See Women in the Military: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military 
Personnel of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong. 34 (1981) (statement 
of Representative Richard White); id. at 42–43 (statement of Representative 
Larry McDonald). 
 71. See, e.g., Jimmy Carter, Equal Rights Amendment: Remarks on Sign-
ing H.J. Res. 638, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1800, 1800–01 (Oct. 20, 1978) (“[T]he Consti-
tution does not require that the President sign a resolution concerning an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States. But I particularly 
wanted to add my signature . . . to again demonstrate as strongly as I possibly 
can my full support for the ratification of the equal rights amendment.”). 
 72. See Jimmy Carter, Selective Service Revitalization: Statement on the 
Registration of Americans for the Draft, 1 PUB. PAPERS 289, 289 (Feb. 8, 1980) 
(“I will seek from Congress funds to register American young men under exist-
ing law.—I will seek additional authority to register women for noncombat 
service to our Nation.”). 
 73. See id. at 290 (“[W]omen are not assigned to units where engagement 
in close combat would be part of their duties, and I have no intention of chang-
ing that policy.”). 
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Carter explicitly linked his proposal to support for the 
ERA. He identified registration and conscription eligibility as 
responsibilities that would confirm women’s full citizenship and 
entitlement to equal rights. “Just as we are asking women to 
assume additional responsibilities,” Carter explained, “it is 
more urgent than ever that the women in America have full 
and equal rights under the Constitution. Equal obligations de-
serve equal rights.”74 
Debate over Carter’s proposal dominated Congress for 
months, until Congress passed on June 25, 1980, and Carter 
signed on June 27, a statute funding registration for men on-
ly.75 The Rostker Court would claim that Congress developed 
new reasons for limiting women’s military service in these 
months in 1980. On the Court’s account, the debate about Cart-
er’s proposal was properly considered in isolation. Any earlier 
discussion of women’s military role was irrelevant and not to be 
examined because Congress in 1980 had “thoroughly reconsid-
er[ed] the question of exempting women from [registration], 
and its basis for doing so.”76 
This assertion was meant to facilitate the Court’s decision 
permitting male-only registration to continue, by insisting that 
any constitutionally problematic modes of reasoning about 
women had been left in the past. Rostker contended that Con-
gress’s 1980 debate represented a complete break from history, 
in which Congress decided to exclude women from registration 
for fresh reasons, not grounded in constitutionally illegitimate 
concerns. The Court declared that Congress’s 1980 “decision to 
exempt women from registration was not the ‘‘accidental 
by-product of a traditional way of thinking about females.’’”77 
Since Rostker, scholars have simply repeated the Court’s 
assertion that Congress in 1980 carefully reconsidered whether 
to register women without reflexively relying on traditional 
ideas about women’s appropriate societal role.78 Even Rostker ’s 
 
 74. Id. at 290–91. 
 75. See Act of June 27, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-282, 94 Stat. 552, 552. For 
Carter’s July 2, 1980 proclamation reinstating male-only registration, see 
Proclamation No. 4771, 3 C.F.R. 82 (1981). 
 76. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 75 (1981). 
 77. Id. at 74 (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (quot-
ing Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
judgment))). 
 78. See G. Sidney Buchanan, Women in Combat: An Essay on Ultimate 
Rights and Responsibilities, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 503, 514 (1991) (“In Rostker, the 
Court noted that Congress, in deciding to register only males, carefully re-
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critics appear to have accepted its characterization of women’s 
unequal treatment as located in the past, a “traditional,”79 
“outmoded”80 practice. 
In fact, the debate about Carter’s proposal was not a break 
with the past, and fit smoothly within over a decade of debate 
over women’s military roles. In 1980, powerful governmental 
and popular voices—whether for or against Carter’s proposal—
remained determined to limit women’s military service in ways 
designed to maintain and enforce women’s place in the family 
and civilian employment. Throughout this period, the notion 
that women, but not men, had primary responsibilities that 
were domestic and private was not, as a descriptive matter, 
out-of-date or a remnant of history. It shaped ongoing political 
and popular debates over women’s military service. 
Many congressional advocates of Carter’s proposal were 
the same people supporting the ERA, but contending the 
Amendment would cause less change than ERA opponents en-
visioned. Like Carter, they explicitly linked Carter’s proposal to 
support for the ERA.81 They explained, moreover, that Carter’s 
 
viewed and reaffirmed the governmental policy of excluding women from mili-
tary combat. In light of that careful review and reaffirmation, it would border 
on the fatuous to hold that Congress does not intend for its exclusion of women 
from military combat to serve the government’s interest in raising and sup-
porting armies.” (footnote omitted)); Edward L. Froelich, Defending the Equal 
Protection Jurisprudence in Lamprecht v. FCC: A Matter of Judgment, 10 J.L. 
& POL. 263, 287–88 (1994) (“[W]here Congress has given due attention to the 
legislation a court should show deference. However, where Congress has cur-
sorily examined and reflexively approved certain legislation, a court is not 
bound to defer to Congress. . . . Congress roundly and vigorously debated the 
matter in Rostker—drafting women into the armed forces.”); Kelly, supra note 
22, at 97 (“The extensive legislative history noted by the Court in Rostker fully 
supports the fact that Congress carefully considered the issues.”); id. at 100 
(“Having thoroughly dismantled the notion that Congress has reflexively or 
thoughtlessly chosen to exclude women from combat, the final inquiry must be 
made.”); Earl F. Martin, Separating United States Service Members from the 
Bill of Rights, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 599, 640 (2004) (“Absent such explicit and 
thorough consideration of the issue by Congress, a civilian branch of the gov-
ernment specifically tasked to oversee military matters, the Rostker majority 
might possibly have brought a great deal more skepticism to the case.”). 
 79. Diane H. Mazur, A Blueprint for Law School Engagement with the 
Military, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 473, 490 (2005); Vojdik, supra note 
22, at 333. 
 80. Karen Lazarus Kupetz, Note, Equal Benefits, Equal Burdens: “Skep-
tical Scrutiny” for Gender Classifications After United States v. Virginia, 30 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (1997). 
 81. See 126 CONG. REC. 13,885 (1980) (statement of Senator Carl Levin) 
(“[The ERA] represents a growing recognition of the role that women have and 
should be guaranteed. It just does not seem to me to be consistent or proper for 
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proposal would establish by statute and military regulation ex-
actly what they argued the ERA would establish. 
Congressional advocates of Carter’s proposal stressed that 
Congress and the military would structure any conscription of 
women to preserve women’s domestic roles and would continue 
to exclude women from combat.82 Senator Carl Levin explained 
that “[o]ur society mores” required restricting women “to non-
combat roles.”83 And he emphasized that Congress and the mil-
itary would need to arrange conscription “to avoid” the “absur-
dity”84 of (in Senator John Warner’s words) drafting “a young 
mother” and requiring her to go “off to boot camp leaving the 
baby with the husband.”85 
Leaders of the Defense Department and Selective Service 
System, in turn, testified before Congress that registering 
women and making them eligible for conscription would pro-
mote military effectiveness and national security. But they an-
ticipated that most servicewomen’s work would mirror the jobs 
women dominated in the sex-stratified civilian workplace, 
while the military would shield men from such work. Robert 
Pirie, Jr., the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, 
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, and Bernard Rostker, the Selec-
tive Service System director who would become the named de-
fendant in Rostker, both told Congress that it was “in our na-
tional security interest to register women at this time.”86 Pirie 
testified that “the work women in the Armed Forces do today is 
essential to the readiness and capability of the forces.”87 In 
wartime, the number of women the military required “would 
inevitably expand” and “[h]aving our young women registered 
 
us to talk of opportunity on the one hand and deny responsibility on the oth-
er.”). 
 82. See id. at 13,877–78 (statement of Senator William Cohen); id. at 
13,878–79 (statement of Senator Nancy Kassebaum); id. at 13,882–83 (state-
ment of Senator Jacob Javits). 
 83. Id. at 13,885 (statement of Senator Carl Levin). 
 84. Id. (statement of Senator Carl Levin). 
 85. Id. (statement of Senator John Warner). 
 86. Military Posture and Department of Defense Authorization for Appro-
priations for Fiscal Year 1981 and Armed Forces Educational Assistance Act of 
1980: Hearings on H.R. 6495 [H.R. 6974] and H.R. 7266 Before the H. Comm. 
on Armed Services, 96th Cong., pt. 5, at 155 (1980) (statement of Robert B. Pi-
rie, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, De-
partment of Defense); see also id. (“[Representative Richard] WHITE. Do you 
believe that, Mr. Rostker? Dr. [Bernard D.] ROSTKER[, Director, Selective Ser-
vice System]. Yes, I do.”). 
 87. Id. at 132 (statement of Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Assistant Secretary for 
Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, Department of Defense).  
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in advance will put us in the position to call women if they do 
not volunteer in sufficient numbers.”88 Yet Pirie also explained 
that “[w]omen have traditionally held the vast majority of jobs 
in fields such as administrative/clerical and health 
care/medical. An advantage of registration for women,” he re-
ported, “is that a pool of trained personnel in these traditional-
ly female jobs would exist in the event that sufficient volun-
teers were not available. It would make far greater sense to 
include women in a draft call and thereby gain many of these 
skills than to draft only males who would not only require 
training in these fields but would be drafted for employment in 
jobs traditionally held by females.”89 
Despite such arguments, Carter’s proposal sparked sub-
stantial and effective opposition within Congress and from 
many of the popular groups successfully fighting ERA ratifica-
tion. Like Carter’s supporters, opponents of registering women 
explicitly linked Carter’s proposal to the ERA. They identified 
Carter’s proposal as an attempt to impose ERA requirements 
by statute and military regulation,90 and contended that regis-
tering women—even under Carter’s proposal—would disrupt 
women’s social roles, particularly in the family. 
Rostker would eventually quote a Senate Armed Services 
Committee report from June 20, 1980 as evidence of strong 
congressional, military, and popular opposition to women in 
combat.91 But in passages of the Senate report that Rostker did 
not quote, the committee justified its opposition to registering 
and conscripting women by explaining that women’s ultimate 
responsibilities were familial and private. The committee re-
counted that “witnesses representing a variety of groups testi-
 
 88. Id. (statement of Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Manpow-
er, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, Department of Defense); see also Registra-
tion of Women: Hearings on H.R. 6569 Before the Subcomm. on Military Per-
sonnel of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong. 21 (1980) 
(“[Representative Bill] NICHOLS. . . . Mr. Secretary, in your personal view do 
you feel there is a military need to register women? Mr. PIRIE. Yes, sir, we 
have women serving very effectively in military positions today. It is quite im-
portant to have a pool of applicants that is as large as possible for a variety of 
reasons including military effectiveness.”). 
 89. Registration of Women: Hearings on H.R. 6569 Before the Subcomm. 
on Military Personnel of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, supra note 88, at 6 
(statement of Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpow-
er, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics). 
 90. See id. at 2–3 (statement of Elaine Eidson); id. at 99–102 (statement 
of Elaine Donnelly). 
 91. See infra text accompanying note 153. 
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fied . . . that drafting women would place unprecedented 
strains on family life, whether in peacetime or in time of emer-
gency.”92 The committee itself made the “specific finding[]” that 
“[u]nder the administration’s proposal there is no proposal for 
exemption of mothers of young children. The administration 
has given insufficient attention to necessary changes in Selec-
tive Service rules, such as those governing the induction of 
young mothers, and to the strains on family life that would re-
sult from the registration and possible induction of women.”93 
The committee concluded that “[a] decision which would result 
in a young mother being drafted and a young father remaining 
home with the family in a time of national emergency cannot be 
taken lightly, nor its broader implications ignored. The commit-
tee is strongly of the view that such a result, which would occur 
if women were registered and inducted under the administra-
tion plan, is unwise and unacceptable to a large majority of our 
people.”94 
Concern for preserving women’s family roles pervaded con-
gressional opposition to registering women. Senator Sam Nunn 
warned that Carter’s proposal would “treat the mothers of 
young children exactly the same as the fathers of young child-
ren,” so that in “hundreds, perhaps even thousands of cases” 
there would be “fathers staying home while mothers are 
shipped off for military service under a draft.”95 Nunn declared 
it intolerable to create a system in which women could be 
drafted “leaving their husbands at home to take care of the 
children.”96 Senator John Warner similarly stressed that Cart-
er’s proposal would “require women to go register and become 
eligible for a draft irrespective of their family situation,” mak-
ing no provision “for excluding a young mother.”97 Representa-
tive Marjorie Holt opposed registering women because the “vast 
majority” of women did not want to serve in the military.98 Pre-
 
 92. S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 159 (1980). 
 93. Id. at 160–61 (capitalization omitted). 
 94. Id. at 159. 
 95. 126 CONG. REC. 13,894 (1980) (statement of Senator Sam Nunn). 
 96. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal 
Year 1981: Hearings on S. 2294 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 96th 
Cong., pt. 3, at 1691–92 (1980) (statement of Senator Sam Nunn). 
 97. 126 CONG. REC. 13,885 (1980) (statement of Senator John Warner). 
 98. Military Posture and Department of Defense Authorization for Appro-
priations for Fiscal Year 1981 and Armed Forces Educational Assistance Act of 
1980: Hearings on H.R. 6495 [H.R. 6974] and H.R. 7266 Before the H. Comm. 
on Armed Services, supra note 86, at 145 (statement of Representative Marjo-
rie Holt). 
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sumably, most men would also prefer to avoid conscription. But 
Holt contended that Congress should honor women’s prefe-
rences because women “want to stay home and be wives and 
mothers.”99 Senator Jake Garn identified the proposal to regis-
ter women as “another part of the degradation of the family, 
taking women out of the home.”100 He could not “even conceive 
of that in the tradition of the American family and what it has 
meant to society.”101 
Popular groups also testified before Congress that registra-
tion would unacceptably remove women from their place in the 
family as if women had no more private responsibilities than 
men. Kathleen Teague testified representing Phyllis Schlafly, 
who was spearheading the fight against ERA ratification and 
leading the Coalition Against Drafting Women. Teague ex-
plained that registering women was “contrary to the Judeo-
Christian culture which honors and respects women in their 
role as wives and mothers. It is irrational because it treats as 
fungibles men and women, husbands and wives, and fathers 
and mothers, which they certainly are not.”102 “There is a dif-
ferent role for males and females and it must start with not re-
gistering women.” “Our young women,” she insisted, “have the 
right to be feminine, to get married, to build families and to 
have homes.”103 Rabbi Herman Neuberger, Chairman of the 
Orthodox Jewish Coalition on Registration of Women for the 
Selective Service System, testified that including “women in a 
registration or a draft would deal a severe blow to the tradi-
tional concept of the American family,” in which the woman 
was the “stabilizing element.”104 
In sum, the continued conviction that women could not and 
should not fully participate in military service because their 
true responsibilities were private and domestic shaped debate 
over Carter’s proposal as it shaped debate over the ERA itself. 
 
 99. Id. (statement of Representative Marjorie Holt).  
 100. 126 CONG. REC. 13,888–89 (1980) (statement of Senator Jake Garn). 
 101. Id. (statement of Senator Jake Garn).  
 102. Registration of Women: Hearings on H.R. 6569 Before the Subcomm. 
on Military Personnel of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, supra note 88, at 
103 (statement of Kathleen Teague, representing Phyllis Schlafly, Coalition 
Against Drafting Women). 
 103. Id. at 105 (statement of Kathleen Teague, representing Phyllis Schlaf-
ly, Coalition Against Drafting Women). 
 104. Id. at 77 (statement of Rabbi Herman N. Neuberger, Chairman, Or-
thodox Jewish Coalition on Registration of Women for the Selective Service 
System). 
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Governmental and popular forces—on both sides of the debates 
about Carter’s proposal and the ERA—remained intent on re-
stricting women’s military role in order to protect and enforce 
women’s social roles outside the military. 
B. WOMEN’S LEGAL STATUS IN THE MILITARY AND THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SEX DISCRIMINATION JURISPRUDENCE 
One measure of the strength of Congress’s commitment to 
preserving women’s domestic roles is that Congress continued 
to express this commitment openly despite the development of 
modern sex discrimination jurisprudence. By 1980, Congress’s 
own efforts on behalf of women’s equality outside the military 
context had encouraged the Supreme Court to develop a much 
more rigorous sex discrimination jurisprudence. This jurispru-
dence gave Congress good reason to think that arguments 
about the primacy of women’s domesticity would not help male-
only registration survive a constitutional challenge in court, 
and that the existence of such arguments in the legislative his-
tory of Congress’s rejection of Carter’s proposal might actually 
make a court less likely to uphold male-only registration. Yet 
members of Congress continued to find arguments about do-
mesticity so convincing that they repeatedly opposed register-
ing women on the ground it would interfere with women’s fami-
ly roles. They confronted the new sex discrimination 
jurisprudence, implicitly pressing the Court to narrow that ju-
risprudence’s reach. 
For most of its history, Congress had no reason to fear that 
courts might contest limits on women’s military service. The 
Supreme Court had historically applied rational basis review to 
state action that explicitly treated men and women differently. 
This review required only that there be some “basis in reason” 
for the sex-based distinction.105 Under rational basis review, 
the Supreme Court did not find any unconstitutional sex dis-
crimination until 1971.106 Suits contesting male-only registra-
tion and conscription systematically failed in the lower courts.  
Some courts hardly felt compelled to identify any rationale 
for women’s exclusion.107 Courts that did identify a reason in-
 
 105. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948). 
 106. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74–77 (1971). 
 107. See, e.g., United States v. Reiser, 532 F.2d 673, 673 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(“There is, however, a clear rational relationship between the government’s 
legitimate interests, as expressed in the [Selective Service] Act, and the classi-
fication by sex, and thus no violation of appellee’s constitutional rights.”); 
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voked United States v. St. Clair,108 a 1968 opinion from the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York.109 St. Clair endorsed the norms that had shaped women’s 
legal status in the military. It concluded that male-only regis-
tration and conscription were rational because women’s re-
sponsibilities were domestic and private, rather than political 
and public. “In providing for involuntary service for men and 
voluntary service for women,” St. Clair explained, “Congress 
followed the teachings of history that if a nation is to survive, 
men must provide the first line of defense while women keep 
the home fires burning.”110 
However, state action that explicitly differentiated between 
men and women, like male-only registration, had become con-
stitutionally vulnerable in court by the mid-1970s. In Frontiero 
v. Richardson (1973),111 the Supreme Court reconsidered the 
appropriateness of rational basis review for sex-based state ac-
tion. Congress had passed the ERA in 1972 and enacted sta-
tutes prohibiting sex discrimination in civilian employment in 
the 1960s. The four-judge Frontiero plurality cited Congress’s 
actions as sources of instruction and guidance, explaining that 
 
United States v. Baechler, 509 F.2d 13, 14–15 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) 
(“Considering the nature of the demands of military service, we cannot say 
that Congress had no rational basis for the distinction based on sex. While it is 
true that women may and do perform vital services in the armed forces of the 
United States, and their physical and mental capabilities are valued contribu-
tions to the nation in both peace and war, these characteristics and accom-
plishments do not create a constitutional obligation upon the Government to 
subject them to call equally with men.”); United States v. Camara, 451 F.2d 
1122, 1126 (1st Cir. 1971) (“[W]e are not yet prepared to say that the Congress 
lacked a sufficiently rational basis in confining the draft to males.”); United 
States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621, 623 (7th Cir. 1969) (“We hold such classifica-
tions and deferments are reasonably related to the purposes of the Selective 
Service Act. Congress was entitled to consider factors which would both max-
imize the efficiency and minimize the expense of raising an army and minim-
ize the disruption of what were considered important civilian functions.”); 
United States v. Clinton, 310 F. Supp. 333, 336 (E.D. La. 1970) (“Congression-
al chivalry in drafting men only to comprise an army has a sufficiently ration-
al basis to avoid constitutional condemnation as mere male chauvinism.”); 
Suskin v. Nixon, 304 F. Supp. 71, 72 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (“[T]he legislative policy 
to exclude women . . . from compulsory military service has a rational basis 
which is reasonably related to the congressional power to raise and support an 
army.”). 
 108. 291 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
 109. See United States v. Yingling, 368 F. Supp. 379, 386 (W.D. Pa. 1973) 
(quoting St. Clair); United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618, 621–22 (W.D. Pa. 
1970) (same). 
 110. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. at 124–25. 
 111. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
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“Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon 
sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal 
branch of Government is not without significance to the ques-
tion presently under consideration.”112 The Frontiero plurality 
voted to apply strict scrutiny to sex-based state action, meaning 
that laws explicitly distinguishing between men and women 
would be unconstitutional unless narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.113 Moreover, the Frontiero plurality 
applied strict scrutiny to a sex-based military regulation. It 
struck down a disparity in military benefit provisions that au-
tomatically entitled servicemen to receive dependents’ benefits 
for their wives, but required servicewomen to prove their hus-
bands’ actual dependence.114 Strict scrutiny for sex-based state 
action never secured majority support. But the Supreme Court 
decided in Craig v. Boren (1976) to apply heightened scrutiny to 
sex-based state action, meaning that sex-based state action 
would be unconstitutional unless the sex-based distinction was 
“substantially related to achievement of” “important govern-
mental objectives.”115 
By 1980, the Court had repeatedly found that commit-
ments to preserving women’s circumscribed roles in the family 
and workplace would not justify sex-based state action under 
heightened scrutiny. Indeed, the Court identified such com-
mitments as sources of women’s inequality and part of what its 
sex discrimination jurisprudence was designed to disrupt. For 
instance, the Court explained in 1979 “that the ‘old notio[n]’ 
that ‘generally it is the man’s primary responsibility to provide 
a home and its essentials,’ can no longer justify a statute that 
discriminates on the basis of gender. ‘No longer is the female 
destined solely for the home and the rearing of the family, and 
only the male for the marketplace and the world of ideas.’”116 
 
 112. Id. at 687–88 (plurality opinion). 
 113. See id. at 682, 688 (plurality opinion). 
 114. See id. at 678–79 (plurality opinion). 
 115. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 116. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279–80 (1979) (alteration in original) (quot-
ing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14–15 (1975)); see also Trammel v. United 
States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (“Nowhere in the common-law world—indeed in 
any modern society—is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of 
a separate legal identity and the dignity associated with recognition as a 
whole human being. Chip by chip, over the years those archaic notions have 
been cast aside so that ‘[n]o longer is the female destined solely for the home 
and the rearing of the family, and only the male for the marketplace and the 
world of ideas.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Stanton, 421 U.S. at 14–15)); 
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979) (“[T]he gender classification . . . is 
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During the congressional debate over Carter’s proposal, the 
Justice Department warned Congress that it needed to create a 
legislative history that could survive heightened scrutiny. Dep-
uty Assistant Attorney General Larry Simms appeared before 
the Military Personnel Subcommittee of the House Armed Ser-
vices Committee to testify that if Congress decided to exempt 
women from registration, the Justice Department anticipated 
litigation contesting the decision. In fact, Simms noted that the 
case that would become Rostker v. Goldberg was already un-
derway in the lower courts.117 Simms further reported that any 
constitutional defense of male-only registration could not “call 
on in any way” the legislative history from earlier congressional 
decisions about women’s military service because the earlier 
legislative history was “unfortunately replete” with “sexual ste-
reotypes.”118 Instead, Simms explained that if Congress wanted 
to exclude women from registration and survive a constitution-
al challenge it needed to create a legislative history free from 
the commitments to limiting women’s roles and status that had 
characterized earlier debates on women’s military service. 
“[S]peaking solely for the Department of Justice as litigator,” 
he told Congress, “it should be fairly obvious to this committee 
that the defensibility of the all-male registration is something 
on which Congress perhaps should speak out clearly and for-
mulate the kind of record, if indeed, it chooses to reject the ad-
ministration’s proposal, which will be helpful rather than hurt-
ful in the litigation.” Whether the Justice Department could 
successfully defend male-only registration was “largely a mat-
ter within the jurisdiction of this committee and Mr. Pirie and 
his peers at the Department of Defense.”119 The Justice De-
partment could “use all of the help we can get.”120 
 
. . . . part of the ‘baggage of sexual stereotypes’ that presumes the father has 
the ‘primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials,’ while the 
mother is the ‘‘center of home and family life.’’ Legislation that rests on such 
presumptions, without more, cannot survive scrutiny . . . .” (quoting Orr, 440 
U.S. at 283; Stanton, 421 U.S. at 10; Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534 
n.15 (1975))). 
 117. See Registration of Women: Hearings on H.R. 6569 Before the Sub-
comm. on Military Personnel of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, supra note 
88, at 14 (statement of Larry Simms, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Of-
fice of Legal Counsel). 
 118. Id. at 14–15 (statement of Larry Simms, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General, Office of Legal Counsel). 
 119. Id. at 15 (statement of Larry Simms, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, Office of Legal Counsel). 
 120. Id. at 25 (statement of Larry Simms, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen-
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Congressional opponents of registering women knew they 
needed a legislative history that could survive heightened scru-
tiny. But they were so committed to preserving women’s roles 
outside the military, and so certain this was a convincing ar-
gument for maintaining male-only registration, that they re-
peatedly explained that women’s military service needed to be 
limited to protect and enforce the primacy of women’s private 
obligations. They pushed against the Court’s sex discrimination 
jurisprudence, implicitly challenging the Court to limit its 
scope. 
Ultimately, the legislative history of Congress’s 1980 deci-
sion to reinstate male-only registration was little different from 
the larger ERA debate over women’s military role that had 
been raging since 1970. The continued determination to main-
tain and enforce women’s domestic responsibilities through 
barriers to women’s military service was still evident. And by 
1980, male-only registration had become unprecedentedly vul-
nerable in court. 
II.  ROSTKER AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
COURT AND THE WORLD OUTSIDE THE COURT  
On June 25, 1981, the Supreme Court in Rostker v. Gold-
berg upheld the constitutionality of male-only registration.121 
The Court was so determined to reach this judgment that it 
claimed that Congress had entirely new reasons for excluding 
women from registration in 1980, reasons not grounded in 
modes of thinking about women that might be problematic un-
der modern sex discrimination jurisprudence.122 
The Rostker case began in 1971, with four men suing dur-
ing the Vietnam War and the ERA debate to challenge the con-
stitutionality of registration and conscription.123 The plaintiffs 
started with several arguments, including that conscription 
constituted involuntary servitude and a taking of property 
without due process. By 1973, however, the lower courts had 
dismissed all claims except the contention that exclusively 
 
eral, Office of Legal Counsel). 
 121. 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981). 
 122. See supra text accompanying notes 76–77. 
 123. See Goldberg v. Tarr, 510 F. Supp. 292, 292–93 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Row-
land v. Tarr, 341 F. Supp. 339, 340 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff ’d in part, vacated in 
part per curiam, 480 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1973). 
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male registration and conscription violated constitutional prin-
ciples of equal protection.124 
This suit was another reminder that male-only registration 
and conscription represented a complicated mix of benefits and 
burdens for each sex. Many men received significant benefits 
from military service and their privileged place within it. At the 
same time, registration, especially if leading to conscription, al-
so represented a significant burden that only men experienced. 
The Rostker suit proceeded slowly,125 but on July 18, 1980 
a three-judge federal district court struck down male-only reg-
istration.126 The Supreme Court stayed enforcement of that 
judgment on July 19,127 and decided to hear the case on De-
cember 1.128 
The Supreme Court’s Rostker opinion, written by then-
Justice William Rehnquist,129 is a vivid example of the influ-
ence that extrajudicial forces can exert on the Court’s constitu-
tional jurisprudence. Rostker explicitly took congressional, ex-
ecutive, military, and popular opposition to women in combat 
as sufficient cause to uphold the constitutionality of male-only 
registration. 
Rostker, moreover, offers a window into how extrajudicial 
influence on judicial constitutional interpretation can function 
in a specific case. It suggests that the observation that extra-
judicial developments can shape the Court’s understanding of 
constitutional requirements should not be taken to imply that 
the Court is passive or confronts uniform political and public 
opinion. The Rostker Court did not simply respond to extrajudi-
cial debates about women’s appropriate military role. Indeed, 
the Court did not simply defer to political and professional mili-
tary expertise. While the Court did discuss such expertise,130 
Rostker ’s position upholding male-only registration was in con-
siderable tension with the military’s stated interests. President 
Carter—Commander in Chief,131 Naval Academy graduate, and 
 
 124. See Rowland, 480 F.2d at 546–47. 
 125. See Goldberg, 510 F. Supp. at 292–94 (recounting suit’s procedural 
history from 1971 to 1980). 
 126. See Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 605 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev’d, 
453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
 127. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1311 (1980) (Brennan, Circuit 
Justice). 
 128. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 449 U.S. 1009, 1009 (1980). 
 129. See 453 U.S. at 59. 
 130. See id. at 64–67. 
 131. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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former naval submarine officer132—had supported registering 
women.133 Leading Defense Department and Selective Service 
System officials had testified to Congress that implementing 
Carter’s proposal would promote military effectiveness and na-
tional security.134 
Instead of simply responding to extrajudicial events or de-
ferring to military judgment, Rostker ’s constitutional interpre-
tation actively intervened and enmeshed itself into contempo-
rary extrajudicial debates over women’s military status—
debates that contained important divisions. Rostker drew on 
substantial extrajudicial agreement that women should be ex-
cluded from combat, and staked a position on an issue of signif-
icant extrajudicial disagreement: whether the combat exclusion 
justified male-only registration and conscription eligibility. 
The Rostker opinion was not organized around the doctrin-
al test for heightened scrutiny, although it stated this standard 
applied.135 Instead, Rostker defended Congress’s 1980 decision 
to fund male-only registration in three steps. 
First, the Court explained that Congress had excluded 
women from registration because Congress intended to limit 
any future drafts to men.136 The link between registration and 
conscription was clear; the purpose of registration is to prepare 
for possible future conscription. But the Court’s argument still 
left the question of why a male-only draft would be constitu-
tional. 
The Court’s second step was to argue that Congress in-
tended to limit any future drafts to men because federal sta-
tutes and military regulations limited combat service to men.137 
The link between conscription and combat was significantly 
less clear than the link between registration and conscription. 
Even during World War II and the Vietnam War, many drafted 
men never served in combat; the majority of the military con-
sisted of noncombat personnel.138 The military, moreover, had 
 
 132. See PETER G. BOURNE, JIMMY CARTER: A COMPREHENSIVE BIOGRAPHY 
FROM PLAINS TO POSTPRESIDENCY 54, 64–66 (1997). 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 72, 74. 
 134. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88. 
 135. See 453 U.S. at 69–70. 
 136. See id. at 75–77. 
 137. See id. at 76–77. 
 138. See, e.g., MICHEAL CLODFELTER, VIETNAM IN MILITARY STATISTICS: A 
HISTORY OF THE INDOCHINA WARS, 1772–1991, at 238 (1995) (noting that 
eighty-eight percent of the American troops in Indochina in 1968 “were sup-
port or administrative personnel” and sixty-one percent of the Americans in 
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historically emphasized that women in noncombat roles could 
free men to fight.139 
Indeed, the relationship between conscription and combat 
was a matter of serious dispute in Congress, the White House, 
state legislatures, and the streets when the Court decided 
Rostker. Many ERA supporters conceded that ratification would 
require women to be included in drafts. But they contended, 
perhaps partially to increase the Amendment’s appeal, that 
women would not serve in combat.140 Carter and advocates of 
his 1980 proposal had attempted to implement this arrange-
ment by statute and military regulation. They sought to make 
women eligible for conscription, and argued this was consistent 
with excluding women from combat.141 The three Rostker dis-
senters—Justices Byron White, Thurgood Marshall, and Wil-
liam Brennan—also stressed the difference between conscrip-
tion and combat. They concluded that the government had not 
demonstrated that excluding women from registration and con-
scription eligibility enhances military effectiveness. Instead, 
the dissenters contended, congressional testimony indicated 
that registering women and making them eligible for conscrip-
tion would improve military flexibility and preparedness, even 
if no women were drafted because of abundant female volun-
teers or only a limited number of women were drafted for ex-
clusively noncombat roles.142 
But Rehnquist’s opinion for the Rostker Court reflected 
greater affinity for the claims of the political and popular forces 
opposed to the ERA and to expanding women’s military roles. 
In fact, Rehnquist himself nicely illustrates how extrajudicial 
debates can enter the Court through the appointments 
process.143 As an Assistant Attorney General in 1970, Rehn-
 
World War II were “noncombat troops”). 
 139. See, e.g., Be a Marine . . . Free a Marine to Fight (1943) (U.S. Marine 
Corps Women’s Reserve recruiting poster, on file with author); Enlist in the 
WAVES Release a Man to Fight at Sea (1943) (Navy recruiting poster, on file 
with author). 
 140. See supra text accompanying notes 58–61, 68. 
 141. See supra text accompanying notes 72–73, 82–89. 
 142. See 453 U.S. at 83–86 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 92–113 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
 143. For some of the literature examining how the appointments process 
can influence the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, see ROBERT A. DAHL, 
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 190 (1989) (“Jurists known to be sharply at odds 
with the basic outlook of the president or a majority of senators are not nomi-
nated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Thus the views of a ma-
jority of the justices of the Supreme Court are never out of line for very long 
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quist warned that the ERA could “turn ‘holy wedlock’ into ‘holy 
deadlock.’”144 “The overall implication of the equal rights 
amendment,” he explained, “is nothing less than the sharp re-
duction in importance of the family unit, with the eventual eli-
mination of that unit by no means improbable.”145 On the 
Court, Rehnquist vigorously criticized modern sex discrimina-
tion jurisprudence. He dissented from the Frontiero plurali-
ty,146 and the Craig majority,147 both of which the three Rostker 
dissenters had supported.148 Unsurprisingly, Rehnquist did not 
manage to stop the development of modern sex discrimination 
jurisprudence. The forces of change and the appeal of the gen-
eral principle of sex equality were strong enough that even the 
ERA’s congressional opponents felt compelled to include mod-
ified sex discrimination prohibitions in their proposed substi-
tute amendments.149 But in Rostker—which concerned women’s 
military role, a subject dividing the nation and contributing to 
the ERA’s defeat—Rehnquist led the Court to stake a position 
aligned with ERA opponents on a disputed point in political 
and popular debate.150 Like ERA opponents, Rostker insisted on 
 
with the views prevailing among the lawmaking majorities of the country.”); 
MARTIN SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 27 (1966) (“Since over the whole history of the Court the President 
has had the opportunity of appointing a new Justice on the average of once 
every twenty-two months, it seems unlikely that the Court could long hold out 
against entrenched majority sentiment.”). Richard Funston found that “the 
Court has been more than three times as likely to declare recently enacted 
federal legislation unconstitutional” “during periods of electoral and partisan 
realignment” when “the Court, as a result of its life tenure, is most likely to be 
out of line with the new, dominant law-making majority.” “As time passes,” 
however, “the new majority is enabled to appoint its own adherents to the Su-
preme bench, and the Court increasingly returns to harmony with the new 
lawmaking majority.” Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elec-
tions, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 795, 805, 807 (1975). 
 144. Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to Leonard Garment, Special Consultant to the Presi-
dent 6 (May 4, 1970) (on file with author). 
 145. Id. at 9. 
 146. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 147. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 217 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). 
 148. See id. at 191; Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678. 
 149. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 150. Social scientists have examined correlations between extrajudicial 
forces and the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. Thomas Marshall found 
that since the mid-1930s “[m]ost modern Supreme Court rulings reflect public 
opinion, and overall, the modern Court has been roughly as majoritarian as 
other American policy makers.” THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND 
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the direct connection between conscription eligibility and com-
bat eligibility. 
Yet even assuming one accepted the connection between 
conscription and combat, that still left the question of why 
Congress and the military could constitutionally limit combat 
positions to men. On this, the third and ultimate issue, Rostker 
had only one thing to say. The Court’s reasoning was remarka-
bly bare. The Court simply relied on the significant political 
and popular consensus for excluding women from combat—a 
position that united many ERA supporters and opponents, 
joined Carter and his critics, and went unchallenged in the 
Rostker dissents.151 Here, the Court recognized and built upon 
substantial extrajudicial convergence rather than taking sides 
on a point of divergence. The Court noted that the President in-
tended “to continue the current military policy precluding 
women from combat” and that strong congressional, popular, 
and military sentiment supported excluding women from com-
bat.152 Rostker quoted a passage from the June 20, 1980 report 
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, stating that: 
“The principle that women should not intentionally and routinely en-
gage in combat is fundamental, and enjoys wide support among our 
people. It is universally supported by military leaders who have testi-
fied before the Committee . . . . Current law and policy exclude women 
from being assigned to combat in our military forces, and the Com-
mittee reaffirms this policy.”153 
This passage, and the rest of Rostker, did not explore the 
reasons behind the support for excluding women from combat. 
Nevertheless, the Court took the extrajudicial opposition to 
women in combat as sufficient cause to uphold male-only regis-
tration, stating that “[t]he fact that Congress and the Executive 
have decided that women should not serve in combat fully justi-
 
THE SUPREME COURT, at ix (1989). David Barnum’s examination of “data on 
public opinion and Supreme Court decision making” concluded that “the post-
New Deal Supreme Court” has been “surprisingly consistent with majoritarian 
principles.” David G. Barnum, The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Judi-
cial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period, 47 J. POL. 652, 662 (1985). 
William Mishler and Reginald Sheehan found “that for most of the period 
since 1956, the Court has been highly responsive to majority opinion,” with 
decisions that “have conformed closely to the aggregate policy opinions of the 
American public.” William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme 
Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution?: The Impact of Public Opinion on 
Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 97 (1993). 
 151. See 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (White, J., dissenting); id. at 93 (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). 
 152. Id. at 77 (majority opinion). 
 153. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 96-826, at 157 (1980)). 
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fies Congress in not authorizing their registration, since the 
purpose of registration is to develop a pool of potential combat 
troops.”154 On the same logic, presumably, banning women en-
tirely from military service would also be constitutional if the 
President, Congress, military leaders, and a majority of the 
public did not want women to serve, even voluntarily and in 
noncombat roles. Rostker ’s conclusion about the constitutional 
requirements of equal protection was thus deeply responsive to, 
and actively engaged with, extrajudicial debates. 
III.  WOMEN’S LEGAL STATUS IN THE MILITARY  
SINCE ROSTKER  
Since Rostker, few lawsuits have challenged restrictions on 
women’s military service,155 and no challenges have reached 
the Supreme Court. Two reasons probably explain the paucity 
of litigation. 
First, there have long been close connections between the 
women’s movement and pacifism, and some portion of the 
women’s movement—a natural source of litigation on issues 
implicating sex equality—is not interested in expanding wom-
en’s military role. These feminists do not defend sex-based re-
strictions on women’s military service, but they argue that the 
women’s movement should prioritize strategies to avoid mili-
tary conflict, keep as many people as possible out of military 
service, and reduce the military’s importance in the nation’s 
life.156 
 
 154. Id. at 79. 
 155. For three rare examples, see United States v. Schmucker, 815 F.2d 
413, 419–20 (6th Cir. 1987) (relying on Rostker to uphold constitutionality of 
requiring male conscientious objectors to register while exempting “women 
and males with severe mental deficiencies”); Schwartz v. Brodsky, 265 F. 
Supp. 2d 130, 131–35 (D. Mass. 2003) (relying on Rostker to uphold male-only 
registration); Lewis v. U.S. Army, 697 F. Supp. 1385, 1386, 1392–93 (E.D. Pa. 
1988) (relying on Rostker to uphold Army policy permitting men with General 
Educational Development (GED) certificates to enlist but requiring women to 
have high school diplomas). 
 156. See Stephanie A. Levin, Women and Violence: Reflections on Ending 
the Combat Exclusion, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 821 (1992) (“[W]e must go 
beyond notions of equality which end in the equal right to inflict violence, and 
search for alternative conceptions of citizenship which do not have violence at 
their core.”); Sara Ruddick, Pacifying the Forces: Drafting Women in the Inter-
ests of Peace, 8 SIGNS 471, 473 (1983) (“[C]onscripting women would further 
the feminist effort to eliminate the restrictions on power and mastery that now 
afflict us. But such a solution, adding as it does the wrong of conscription to 
the evils of militarism, only compounds the difficulties of reconciling feminist 
with antimilitarist aims.”); Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: 
 132 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:96 
 
Second, people who are interested in expanding women’s 
military service apparently concluded after Rostker that litiga-
tion was an unpromising route to reform. Rostker suggested 
that the Supreme Court would be unlikely to transform wom-
en’s military role. Moreover, the judiciary’s hierarchical organi-
zation strongly discourages lower courts from undermining 
Rostker. The few lower courts to consider challenges to restric-
tions on women’s military service since Rostker quickly rejected 
the claims, relying on the Rostker precedent.157 As recently as 
2003, the United States District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts cited Rostker to uphold male-only registration.158 
The plaintiffs in Schwartz v. Brodsky—four men required to 
register and one woman excluded from registration—appealed 
on the ground that the extrajudicial changes in women’s mili-
tary status since Rostker had undermined the Rostker 
precedent.159 But at the urging of leading feminist groups, the 
Schwartz plaintiffs decided to dismiss their appeal because 
they did not want to risk that the appellate court might also be 
unwilling to undermine a Supreme Court holding, no matter 
how extrajudicial changes had weakened it.160 
Yet despite the virtual absence of litigation—and the resul-
tant decline in academic attention161—women’s legal status in 
the military has undergone tremendous change since Rostker. 
As the failure of the Schwartz suit suggests, courts have not 
 
Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 25, 26 (1989) 
(“We can’t overcome gender oppression without demilitarizing ourselves and 
our world.”); Jennifer Tiffany, The Equal Opportunity Trap, in LOADED QUES-
TIONS: WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 36, 36 (W. Chapkis ed., 1981) (“Seeking the 
right and opportunity to participate on equal terms in structures that so un-
dermine the welfare of women as the military, and so bolster the exploitation 
of women, simply won’t pass as a feminist priority.”). 
 157. See supra note 155. 
 158. See Schwartz, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 133–34. 
 159. See id. at 131, 132 & n.4. 
 160. See Telephone Interview with Harvey A. Schwartz, Rodgers, Powers & 
Schwartz PC (Dec. 11, 2006) (on file with author). Harvey Schwartz, an em-
ployment and civil rights lawyer, represented the Schwartz plaintiffs. He is 
the father of one plaintiff, Samuel Schwartz, and the stepfather of another, 
Nicole Foley. The family began to think about suing after a dinnertime con-
versation about why Samuel had to register but not Nicole. See id. Harvey 
Schwartz reports that “[d]ismissing this case continues to be a major disap-
pointment for me. If I had it to do over again, I would have gone forward with 
the appeal.” E-mail from Harvey A. Schwartz, Rodgers, Powers & Schwartz 
PC, to Jill Hasday, Professor, University of Minnesota Law School (Dec. 11, 
2006) (on file with author). 
 161. See supra text accompanying notes 11–13. 
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driven this change. Instead, extrajudicial forces have acted 
notwithstanding Rostker ’s protection of the status quo. 
The extrajudicial transformation in women’s military sta-
tus since Rostker has focused, moreover, on women’s combat 
service. In the debates over the ERA and Carter’s proposal, the 
prospect of women in combat was always considered less popu-
lar and more revolutionary than registering and conscripting 
women. Many people saw combat as inherently inconsistent 
with women’s roles, but supported including women in registra-
tion and conscription eligibility on the belief that Congress and 
the military would structure any draft to preserve women’s ex-
isting positions in the family and sex-stratified civilian 
workplace.162 In addition, combat service is arguably more im-
mediately important than registration or conscription eligibility 
in an era with frequent military conflicts but no draft. Since 
Rostker, however, congressional, executive, military, and popu-
lar support for women’s military service, including in combat, 
has dramatically increased. Federal law no longer contains sta-
tutory combat exclusions, the military has opened many, al-
though not all, combat positions to women, and the public has 
become steadily more enthusiastic about women in the mili-
tary, including in combat. 
Rostker concluded that women’s exclusion from registra-
tion, conscription, and combat was consistent with equal pro-
tection, generating no pressure to expand women’s military 
role. Commentators frequently stress and admire the Court’s 
ability to settle constitutional disputes.163 Yet Rostker ’s judg-
ment that women’s rights to equality were not in jeopardy did 
not mean the end of discussion and dispute about that ques-
tion. The claim that restrictions on women’s military role 
threatened sex equality moved to other parts of the government 
for redress, and has enjoyed notable success there. Congress, 
the executive, and the military have continued to debate how 
sex equality should be upheld, and to generate evolving an-
swers, while the Court’s position has remained unchanged. 
These extrajudicial actors have been driven by their commit-
ment to sex equality—paired with their recognition of the vo-
 
 162. See supra Part I.A. 
 163. See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, Defending Judicial Su-
premacy: A Reply, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 455, 457, 471–72, 482 (2000); Larry 
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpreta-
tion, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1377, 1380 (1997); Larry Alexander & Lawrence 
B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1634 (2005) 
(book review). 
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lunteer military’s pragmatic need for female talent—to dramat-
ically, if incrementally, expand women’s military role, including 
in combat. As this record illustrates, the Court is not the only 
developer and enforcer of equality norms, or even the most im-
portant source of those norms in some situations. 
Indeed, the extrajudicial changes in women’s military role 
increasingly raise questions about the status of Rostker itself. 
The filing of Schwartz is unsurprising and additional lawsuits 
challenging sex-based restrictions on military service are likely 
because the extrajudicial transformation of women’s military 
status has undercut the factual premises and cultural assump-
tions behind Rostker ’s interpretation of constitutional equal 
protection. This transformation makes clear that Rostker is in-
consistent with the rest of the Supreme Court’s sex discrimina-
tion jurisprudence. In fact, Congress, the executive, and the 
military are very aware that the extrajudicial changes since 
Rostker in women’s military status may undermine Rostker and 
support a Court judgment striking down male-only registra-
tion, conscription eligibility, and combat positions. They have 
continued to expand women’s military role anyway, cognizant 
that their developing extrajudicial understanding of how wom-
en’s military service should be structured to reflect women’s 
equality could one day be judicially codified in a decision de-
manding still more transformation of women’s military status. 
A. CONGRESSIONAL, EXECUTIVE, MILITARY, AND POPULAR 
CHANGE SINCE ROSTKER 
After Rostker, Congress, the executive, the military, and 
the public continued to consider whether women’s military role 
should expand in the interest of sex equality. Courts created no 
pressure for change, but nonjudicial actors within and outside 
the government kept the issue alive. The Defense Advisory 
Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), a civilian 
advisory group within the Defense Department, played a par-
ticularly important role. 
DACOWITS has attracted little scholarly attention,164 but 
for decades the group has interviewed servicewomen, ques-
tioned military leaders, and visited military bases in order to 
develop an evolving understanding of how to structure military 
service to reflect and promote women’s equality. DACOWITS 
 
 164. For an exception describing some DACOWITS work through the 
1980s, see Mary Fainsod Katzenstein, Feminism Within American Institu-
tions: Unobtrusive Mobilization in the 1980s, 16 SIGNS 27, 47–53 (1990). 
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has also diligently worked, with significant success, to convince 
the military, the executive, Congress, and the public to adopt 
and enforce this evolving understanding of sex equality norms. 
As one DACOWITS report noted, “[t]he two most distinctive 
characteristics of the DACOWITS throughout its history of con-
tributions to the Department of Defense have been insight and 
tenacity.”165 Phyllis Schlafly, leader of the campaign against 
ERA ratification and staunch DACOWITS opponent, called 
DACOWITS members “the most effective special-interest lob-
byists ever to function in Washington.”166 
As early as 1975, DACOWITS concluded that statutory 
combat exclusions threatened both sex equality and the volun-
teer military’s personnel goals.167 Over the next half decade, 
DACOWITS advised the Defense Department and military to 
“attach the highest priority to efforts to repeal” the exclusions, 
explaining that they “constitute major roadblocks to the full 
utilization of and equal opportunities for women in the Servic-
es.”168 DACOWITS Chair Sally Richardson also lobbied Con-
gress, stressing “the opportunities that have been closed to 
women because of” the exclusions and “the difficulty” the ex-
clusions “created for the services in managing its women per-
sonnel.”169 
The 1970s effort to remove the statutory combat exclusions 
was unsuccessful, but DACOWITS did not drop its commitment 
to securing repeal.170 The group vigorously pressed the issue 
 
 165. DACOWITS DEFENSE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE SER-
VICES, HISTORY AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS 21 (1997). 
 166. Phyllis Schlafly, Feminist Lobbyists Get Free Pass, CHATTANOOGA 
TIMES FREE PRESS, Mar. 8, 2002, at B9. 
 167. See Recommendations Requests for Information Commendations: 
DACOWITS Fall Meeting 1, 3 (Nov. 14–18, 1976) (on file with author); Women 
in the Military: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel of the H. 
Comm. on Armed Services, supra note 70, at 192–93 (statement of Sally K. 
Richardson, Chairperson, Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Ser-
vices). 
 168. Women in the Military: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military 
Personnel of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, supra note 70, at 180 (Recom-
mendation #1, Fall Meeting 1979, attachment to the statement of Ms. Sally K. 
Richardson, Chairperson, DACOWITS). 
 169. Id. at 192–93 (statement of Sally K. Richardson, Chairperson, Defense 
Advisory Committee on Women in the Services). 
 170. See, e.g., Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DA-
COWITS), Recommendations, Requests for Information, and Continuing Con-
cerns Made at the 1989 Fall Conference 58 (1989) (on file with author) [herei-
nafter DACOWITS 1989 Fall Conference]; Defense Advisory Committee on 
Women in the Services (DACOWITS), Recommendations, Requests for Infor-
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again when it sensed a ripe moment. First, DACOWITS rec-
ommended in 1989 that the Army, which was not subject to 
statutory combat exclusions,171 “conduct a 4-year test program 
under which women in the Army will be allowed to enter all 
military occupational specialties (including combat and combat 
support).”172 Then in 1991, after servicewomen’s demonstrated 
success in the Persian Gulf War, DACOWITS seized the oppor-
tunity and began a full-time campaign against the statutory 
combat exclusions. The group used its spring 1991 meeting 
with Defense Department and military leaders to explain why 
repealing the exclusions would recognize and promote service-
women’s equality, while simultaneously giving the military 
“[f]lexibility . . . to fully utilize all qualified personnel.” DA-
COWITS advised that eliminating the combat exclusion sta-
tutes would make “[a]bility rather than gender . . . the basis for 
assignment,” enhance the “[a]cceptance of Servicewomen as full 
partners,” and expand “[o]pportunities . . . for Servicewomen to 
compete fairly for assignments and promotion.”173 
DACOWITS members spent the next months urging Con-
gress to repeal the combat exclusion statutes and making the 
case for repeal to the public.174 DACOWITS Chair Becky Cos-
 
mation, Continuing Concerns, and a Statement of Appreciation Made at the 
1990 Spring Conference 435 (1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter DACO-
WITS 1990 Spring Conference]; Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the 
Services (DACOWITS), Recommendations, Requests for Information, Continu-
ing Concerns, and a Statement of Appreciation Made at the 1990 Fall Confe-
rence 303 (1990) (on file with author) [hereinafter DACOWITS 1990 Fall Con-
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 171. See supra note 38. 
 172. DACOWITS 1989 Fall Conference, supra note 170, at 3; see also DA-
COWITS 1990 Spring Conference, supra note 170, at 434 (repeating recom-
mendation); DACOWITS 1990 Fall Conference, supra note 170, at 306 (same); 
Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS), Rec-
ommendations, Requests for Information, Continuing Concerns, and a State-
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(statement of Representative Patricia Schroeder). 
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Final Draft DACOWITS 1991 Fall Conference Miami Beach, Florida 140 
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 174. For example, one DACOWITS member advocated repeal of the statu-
tory combat exclusions in a university alumni magazine. See Thomas H. Staf-
ford Jr., Women in Combat?, NCSU, Nov. 1991, at 44, 44 (“Consideration for 
combat should be based on individual ability. Women who have the physical, 
mental and emotional attributes for combat should not be excluded on gender 
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tantino, testifying in June 1991 before the Senate Armed Ser-
vices Committee, stressed that statutory combat exclusions li-
mited women’s opportunities, and that servicewomen sought 
and deserved “[e]qual responsibility, equal opportunity, and 
equal commitment,” “to be full-fledged defenders of our country 
and our military.”175 By then, Congress had become more re-
ceptive to the idea that it should eliminate statutory combat 
exclusions as part of its commitment to sex equality. 
In December 1991, Congress repealed the statutory prohi-
bitions, dating from 1948, on assigning women in the Air Force, 
Navy, and Marines to combat aircraft.176 This meant there was 
no longer any statutory combat exclusion for the Air Force. The 
1991 statute also modified the remaining statutory combat ex-
clusion, which covered the Navy and Marines.177 In addition, 
the statute created a “Commission on the Assignment of Wom-
en in the Armed Forces” to “assess the laws and policies re-
stricting the assignment of female service members.”178 
Congressional supporters of the 1991 statute emphasized 
that the law would establish and confirm that the commitment 
to sex equality was a basic organizing principle of the American 
polity, and one that Congress was determined to defend. Sena-
tor Edward Kennedy, an author of the 1991 law, explained that 
the bill was attempting to “eliminate gender as a classification 
and commit this Nation to ability as the criterion for classifica-
tion.” “[W]e, as legislators and policymakers,” he stated, “ought 
to be able to make a judgment and a decision about what we be-
lieve.”179 “Barriers based on sex discrimination are coming 
 
 175. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal 
Years 1992 and 1993: Hearings on S. 1507 Before the S. Comm. on Armed Ser-
vices, 102d Cong., pt. 6, at 861 (1991) (statement of Becky Costantino, Chair, 
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down in every part of our society,” and “[t]he Armed Forces 
should be no exception.”180 Senator Brockman Adams stressed 
that “[w]hat is at stake is a fundamental issue of equality.”181 
“Nowhere else in our society,” he contended, “do we condone the 
exclusion of women simply on the basis of gender.”182 “Equal 
opportunity,” Senator Patrick Leahy confirmed, “has no gend-
er.”183 
Even opponents of narrowing the statutory combat exclu-
sions in 1991 agreed that Congress should express and confirm 
the nation’s core commitment to sex equality. The Senate 
Armed Services Committee supported establishing a commis-
sion to study the restrictions on women’s military service, but 
recommended against any immediate effort to reduce statutory 
combat exclusions. In reporting its position, the committee em-
phasized that “[a]s a matter of basic principle, the committee 
believes that equal opportunity has no gender.”184 Committee 
member John Glenn stressed that “[o]pportunity in the United 
States of America should have no gender,”185 and explained 
that the committee had “set out on a course to objectively de-
termine how equal opportunity for all women in the military 
should be improved.”186 
During the congressional debates over the 1991 statute, 
President George H.W. Bush’s Defense Department “‘wel-
come[d] th[e] legislation’” without indicating whether the mili-
tary would open combat aircraft to women.187 After the 1991 
law passed, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney announced that 
he would wait for the recommendations of the Commission on 
the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces before deciding 
whether to alter military policies.188 
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The commission—which reported on November 15, 1992, 
after Bush lost his reelection bid to Bill Clinton—engaged in its 
own debate about how women’s military role should be struc-
tured to reflect sex equality. Some commissioners and wit-
nesses made claims that resonated with the opposition to the 
ERA and Carter’s proposal, warning that “assigning women to 
combat would be a fundamental departure from sound Ameri-
can and military values” because it would disrupt “civilized or-
der in sexual and family relationships.”189 However, other 
commissioners and witnesses argued that Congress and the 
military should grant women significantly greater military op-
portunities, including in combat, in order to advance sex equal-
ity and serve the manpower (or womanpower) needs of an all-
volunteer military. Some stated that women “should be treated 
as individuals,” and explained “that placing the best qualified 
person in a specialty requires servicemembers” to “be judged as 
individuals” “and not as men or women.”190 Some contended 
“that, as long as American women must accept broad societal 
responsibilities, they have the right to be represented in all as-
pects of the military, including ground combat.”191 
Les Aspin, Clinton’s Defense Secretary, sided with these 
latter voices without going as far as some. Aspin came to the 
Clinton Administration from Congress. He voted for the ERA in 
1971,192 and voted to extend the ERA’s ratification deadline in 
1978.193 As chairman of the House Armed Services Committee 
in 1992, Aspin criticized combat exclusions for barring women 
from “the essence of” military service, “[t]he key to advance-
ment,” and “lots of promotion possibilities.”194 As he explained, 
“the whole promotion system; the prestige in the service is 
oriented toward one of the combat elements.”195 Aspin also sug-
gested to the military leaders appearing before him that com-
bat exclusions were linked to women’s unequal citizenship and 
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to wider patterns of sex discrimination in the military. He 
asked whether combat exclusions made women “second-class 
citizens,” fostering an attitude in the military that “it is fair 
game to treat them with discrimination.”196 “[I]f it is an official 
policy of each of the services to discriminate, then what you 
have is officially endorsed discrimination at one level, which 
then goes over into unofficially endorsed discrimination at oth-
er levels.”197 
In April 1993, Defense Secretary Aspin issued a memoran-
dum establishing a new “Policy On The Assignment Of Women 
In The Armed Forces” that implemented many of the changes 
DACOWITS had been urging since passage of the 1991 law.198 
This policy took advantage of the 1991 elimination of the statu-
tory provisions barring women from combat aircraft to provide 
that all the armed services would “permit women to compete 
for assignments in aircraft, including aircraft engaged in com-
bat missions.”199 The policy also directed the Navy to “open as 
many additional ships to women as is practicable within cur-
rent law” and “develop a legislative proposal” to repeal the re-
maining statutory combat exclusion. The Army and Marines 
were instructed to “study opportunities for women to serve in 
additional assignments, including, but not limited to, field artil-
lery and air defense artillery.” The Defense Department was 
ordered to establish an implementation committee “to ensure 
that the policy on the assignment of women is applied consis-
tently across the services,” and “review and make recommenda-
tions” about the continued appropriateness of the Defense De-
partment’s “‘Risk Rule.’”200 This Risk Rule, which Defense 
Secretary Frank Carlucci had announced in February 1988, 
permitted the “closure of noncombatant positions or units” to 
women “if their risks of exposure to direct combat, hostile fire, 
or capture are equal to or greater than the risks for land, air, or 
sea combat units with which they are associated in a theater of 
operations.”201 
 
 196. Id. at 77 (statement of Representative Les Aspin).  
 197. Id. (statement of Representative Les Aspin). 
 198. See DACOWITS Fall Conference October 18–21, 1992 Hosted by U.S. 
Army 44–45 (1992) (on file with author). 
 199. Memorandum from Les Aspin, Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Army; 
Sec’y of the Navy; Sec’y of the Air Force; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; As-
sistant Sec’y of Def. (Force Mgmt. & Pers.); Assistant Sec’y of Def. (Reserve 
Affairs) 1 (Apr. 28, 1993) (on file with author). 
 200. Id. at 2. 
 201. Memorandum from Frank Carlucci, Sec’y of Def., to Sec’ys of the Mili-
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Aspin’s April 1993 memorandum did not represent a com-
plete commitment to eliminating all laws and regulations that 
excluded women from military positions. It stated that military 
policy would continue to exclude women from “units engaged in 
direct combat on the ground, assignments where physical re-
quirements are prohibitive and assignments where the costs of 
appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements are prohibi-
tive.”202 The services could also “propose additional exceptions, 
together with the justification for such exceptions, as they 
deem appropriate.”203 But the April 1993 memorandum did 
represent an unprecedented military commitment to expanding 
women’s opportunities. 
The Defense Department and Navy (with DACOWITS’ 
support)204 proceeded to lobby Congress to remove the remain-
ing statutory combat exclusion. Vice Admiral Ronald Zlatoper, 
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel 
and Training, and the Chief of Naval Personnel, stressed the 
claims “of young women and sailors and officers who want to 
serve their country as professional equals with men,” and ob-
served that maintaining a statutory combat exclusion “would 
serve no purpose other than keeping the Navy from putting the 
best qualified men and women into the right jobs.”205 
Congress responded to this initiative in November 1993 by 
repealing the remaining statutory combat exclusion.206 The 
new law gave the military discretion to assign servicewomen to 
any position, although it required the Defense Secretary to pro-
vide the congressional armed services committees with thirty 
days of notice before opening a new combat position to wom-
en.207 If the Defense Secretary wanted to assign women “to 
units and positions whose mission requires routine engagement 
 
tary Dep’ts 1 (Feb. 2, 1988) (on file with author). 
 202. Aspin, supra note 199, at 2. 
 203. Id. 
 204. For an article by DACOWITS’ chair in 1993, see Ellen Press Murdoch, 
Equal Combat Roles Put Muscle in Defense, CHI. TRIB., May 30, 1993, § 6, at 
11 (“Military women want to be accepted as full participants in our country’s 
defense.”). 
 205. Women in Combat: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Forces 
and Personnel of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong. 50 (1994) 
(statement of Vice Admiral Ronald J. Zlatoper, Deputy Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Manpower, Personnel and Training, Chief of Naval Personnel, Depart-
ment of the Navy). 
 206. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-160, § 541, 107 Stat. 1547, 1659 (1993). 
 207. See id. § 542(a). 
 142 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [93:96 
 
in direct combat on the ground,” Congress required ninety days 
of notice.208 
Since enactment of the 1993 statute, military regulations 
have steadily opened more combat positions to women. In a 
January 13, 1994 memorandum, Aspin announced that the im-
plementation committee established under his earlier memo-
randum had concluded that the Defense Department’s Risk 
Rule was “no longer appropriate.”209 Aspin rescinded the Risk 
Rule as of October 1, 1994, and put forth a new “direct ground 
combat assignment rule” to control military policy starting Oc-
tober 1.210 This rule provides that “[s]ervice members are eligi-
ble to be assigned to all positions for which they are qualified, 
except that women shall be excluded from assignment to units 
below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in 
direct combat on the ground.”211 The January 13, 1994 memo-
randum defines “[d]irect ground combat” as “engaging an ene-
my on the ground with individual or crew served weapons, 
while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of 
direct physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel. Direct 
ground combat takes place well forward on the battlefield while 
locating and closing with the enemy to defeat them by fire, ma-
neuver, or shock effect.”212 
This January 13, 1994 memorandum was designed to rec-
ognize and promote commitments to sex equality, and enhance 
women’s status in the military. Aspin told the military services 
to “use this guidance to expand opportunities for women” and 
stated that “[n]o units or positions previously open to women 
[would] be closed under these instructions.”213 At the same 
time, the memorandum’s approach was incremental, shrinking 
rather than eliminating sex-based differences in treatment. In 
addition to affirming women’s exclusion from direct ground 
 
 208. Id. § 542(b). The 1993 statute also instructed the Defense Secretary to 
apply the same occupational performance standards to men and women, see 
id. § 543(a)–(b), and provide Congress with sixty days of notice before chang-
ing the occupational performance standards for a military field in a way ex-
pected to increase or decrease by at least ten percent the number of women 
entering or being assigned to the field, see id. § 543(c). 
 209. Memorandum from Les Aspin, Sec’y of Def., to the Sec’y of the Army; 
Sec’y of the Navy; Sec’y of the Air Force; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; As-
sistant Sec’y of Def. (Pers. & Readiness); Assistant Sec’y of Def. (Reserve Af-
fairs) 1 (Jan. 13, 1994) (on file with author). 
 210. Id.  
 211. Id.  
 212. Id. at 1–2. 
 213. Id. at 2. 
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combat, the memorandum also informed the services that they 
could exclude women, subject to Defense Department approval, 
“where the Service Secretary attests that the costs of appropri-
ate berthing and privacy arrangements are prohibitive,” “where 
units and positions are doctrinally required to physically collo-
cate and remain with direct ground combat units that are 
closed to women,” “where units are engaged in long range re-
connaissance operations and Special Operations Forces mis-
sions,” and/or “where job related physical requirements would 
necessarily exclude the vast majority of women Service mem-
bers.” The military services were also permitted to “propose ad-
ditional exceptions” to the Defense Department.214 
On January 21, 1994, Secretary Aspin relayed the contents 
of his April 1993 and January 13, 1994 memoranda to the con-
gressional armed services committees and reported on the 
changes the memoranda had already prompted. He noted that 
every service had opened “all combat aircraft types” to women. 
In addition, even before the 1993 repeal of the last statutory 
combat exclusion, the Navy had opened eighteen additional 
noncombatant ships to women, making approximately one 
thousand more sea billets open to women. In light of the 1993 
repeal, the Navy was “preparing plans” to “allow women to 
serve aboard combatant vessels.”215 
In the months and years to follow, Defense Department 
letters to the congressional armed services committees reported 
the progressive expansion of military positions open to women, 
citing both commitments to women’s equality and the pragmat-
ic military benefits of women’s increased participation. In Feb-
ruary 1994, for instance, Defense Secretary William Perry re-
ported that the Navy would allow “women, both enlisted and 
officer personnel, to be assigned permanently to surface comba-
tant ships, all combat aircraft squadrons, all afloat staff, and 
units of the Naval Construction Force.” He explained that this 
was “a very important step to integrate and utilize women bet-
ter in the Navy, as well as to broaden and strengthen signifi-
cantly their career opportunities. This expansion of assignment 
opportunities acknowledges the future diversity of the work 
force and at the same time enables the Navy to assign the best 
 
 214. Id. 
 215. Letter from Les Aspin, Sec’y of Def., to Ronald V. Dellums, Chairman, 
House Comm. on Armed Servs. 1–2 (Jan. 21, 1994) (on file with author); Letter 
from Les Aspin, Sec’y of Def., to Sam Nunn, Chairman, Senate Comm. on 
Armed Servs. 1–2 (Jan. 21, 1994) (on file with author) (same). 
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individual to each job.”216 In July 1994, Perry reported that 
when the new direct ground combat assignment rule an-
nounced in Aspin’s January 13, 1994 memorandum became ef-
fective on October 1, 1994 approximately eighty-one thousand 
additional positions would be opened to women, meaning that a 
total of ninety-two percent of the career fields and more than 
eighty percent of the military positions in the Defense Depart-
ment would be open to women.217 Perry explained that the De-
fense Department “implemented these policy changes to in-
crease the pool of qualified individuals for each military job, 
 
 216. Letter from William J. Perry, Sec’y of Def., to Ronald V. Dellums, 
Chairman, House Comm. on Armed Servs. 1 (Feb. 4, 1994) (on file with au-
thor); Letter from William J. Perry, Sec’y of Def., to Sam Nunn, Chairman, 
Senate Comm. on Armed Servs. 1 (Feb. 4, 1994) (on file with author) (same). 
In May 1999, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Rudy 
deLeon reported that the Navy would open Mine Countermeasure and Mine 
Coastal Hunter ships to female officers, although such ships would remain 
closed to enlisted women because of “prohibitive modification cost.” Letter 
from Rudy deLeon, Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness, to Floyd Spence, 
Chairman, House Comm. on Armed Servs. 1 (May 6, 1999) (on file with au-
thor); Letter from Rudy deLeon, Under Sec’y of Def. for Pers. & Readiness, to 
John Warner, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Armed Servs. 1 (May 6, 1999) (on 
file with author) (same). In July 1999, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Force Management Policy Francis Rush, Jr. reported that the Navy would 
also open Mine Countermeasure and Mine Coastal Hunter ships to enlisted 
women because “[t]he Navy recently reevaluated the cost based on experiences 
gained from embarking women in combatant ships” and “[i]t has now been de-
termined that the initial modifications needed to reconfigure female enlisted 
berthing would be negligible.” Letter from Francis M. Rush, Jr., Acting Assis-
tant Sec’y of Def. for Force Mgmt. Policy, to Floyd Spence, Chairman, House 
Comm. on Armed Servs. 1 (July 22, 1999) (on file with author); Letter from 
Francis M. Rush, Jr., Acting Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Force Mgmt. Policy, to 
John Warner, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Armed Servs. 1 (July 22, 1999) (on 
file with author) (same). In May 2005, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld re-
ported that the Navy would open Patrol Coastal ships to female officers. See 
Letter from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., to Duncan Hunter, Chairman, 
House Comm. on Armed Servs. 1 (May 2, 2005) (on file with author); Letter 
from Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def., to John Warner, Chairman, Senate 
Comm. on Armed Servs. 1 (May 2, 2005) (on file with author) (same). 
 217. See Letter from William J. Perry, Sec’y of Def., to Ronald V. Dellums, 
Chairman, House Comm. on Armed Servs. 1 (July 28, 1994) (on file with au-
thor). The Army would “open all units and positions except Armor, Infantry, 
and ground Special Operations Forces units below the brigade level and any 
closely associated support units such as Combat Engineer Companies and Air 
Defense Artillery batteries.” Id. The Marines would “open 33 additional Mili-
tary Occupational Specialties and nine types of units previously closed to 
women,” so that “[o]nly the Marine Corps Infantry Regiment and those closely 
associated support units and positions remain closed.” Id. at 1–2. In the Air 
Force, “[o]nly Air Force Pararescue, Combat Controllers and those units and 
positions routinely associated with direct ground combat” would remain closed 
to women. Id. at 2. 
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regardless of gender, to allow the Department to meet the fu-
ture needs of our country.”218 
Congress remains interested in monitoring the combat po-
sitions that the military opens to women or keeps closed. A 
2002 statute required the Defense Secretary to submit to Con-
gress, for each fiscal year from 2002 to 2006, “a report on the 
status of female members of the Armed Forces,” including in-
formation on “[t]he positions, weapon systems, and fields of 
skills” closed to women, and the reason for each exclusion.219 
The 2006 report identified nineteen Army positions (involv-
ing infantry, armor, special forces, and ranger service) closed to 
women because they involve direct ground combat as their 
primary mission, and eight Army positions (involving field ar-
tillery) closed because they involve collocation with direct 
ground combat units.220 The Air Force reported thirteen posi-
tions closed because they involve collocation with direct ground 
combat units.221 The Navy reported seven positions (involving 
Special Warfare and Special Operations) closed because they 
involve direct ground combat as their primary mission, thirty-
five positions closed because they involve collocation with direct 
ground combat units, and two areas of service (Submarines and 
Patrol Coastal ships) closed on the ground that the costs of ap-
propriate berthing and privacy arrangements are prohibitive.222 
The Marines reported twenty-five positions closed because they 
involve direct ground combat as their primary mission.223 No 
service reported closing any positions to women because of job 
related physical requirements. 
The United States Government Accountability Office calcu-
lates the current combat exclusions in different terms. It re-
ports that “females are excluded from 178 enlisted occupational 
specialties (5 percent of all enlisted occupational specialties), 
mostly in infantry, gun crew, and seamanship; electronic 
equipment repairers; and electrical/mechanical equipment re-
 
 218. Id. at 1. 
 219. Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 562(a), (b)(1), 116 Stat. 2458, 2554–55 (2002). 
 220. See OFFICE OF PERS. & READINESS, MILITARY PERS. POLICY, DEP’T OF 
DEF., ANNUAL REPORT ON STATUS OF FEMALE MEMBERS OF THE ARMED 
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES FY 2002–06, at 2. 
 221. See id. at 3. 
 222. See id. at 4–5. 
 223. See id. at 6. 
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pairers occupational areas.” Women “are excluded from 17 of-
ficer specialties (less than 1 percent of all officer specialties).”224 
In the ongoing Iraq War, the military is using servicewo-
men to the fullest extent possible under current military regu-
lations, and may be testing regulatory boundaries.225 One hun-
dred American servicewomen have died in the Iraq War as of 
October 4, 2008.226 Yet Congress, the executive, and the mili-
tary have continued to express enthusiastic support for wom-
en’s military role, including in combat. Officials have empha-
sized how essential women’s military service, including combat 
service, is to the armed forces. General George Casey, Jr., 
Commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq in 2005, testified be-
fore the House Armed Services Committee about his commit-
ment to maintaining “the policies and programs” allowing ser-
vicewomen to assume a wide-ranging military role, including in 
combat. He reported that servicewomen “perform magnificently 
every day, and we couldn’t do without them in the positions 
that they are in.”227 Ronald James told the Senate Armed Ser-
 
 224. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MILITARY PERSONNEL: REPORT-
ING ADDITIONAL SERVICEMEMBER DEMOGRAPHICS COULD ENHANCE CON-
GRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT 45 (2005). 
 225. See 152 CONG. REC. S8542 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2006) (statement of Sena-
tor Robert Menendez) (“The Navy and the Air Force have begun to allow fe-
male soldiers to fly fighters and bombers. The Army has expanded the role of 
women in ground-combat operations. . . . This would have been unheard of a 
decade ago, but it is happening right now.”); 151 CONG. REC. E1492 (daily ed. 
July 14, 2005) (statement of Representative Jim Cooper) (“I rise today to rec-
ognize and congratulate U.S. Army Sgt. Leigh Ann Hester, a recent recipient 
of the Silver Star Medal—the Army’s third highest award for valor in com-
bat. . . . According to an Army account, ‘[Sgt.] Hester led her team through the 
‘kill zone’ and into a flanking position, where she assaulted a trench line with 
grenades and M203 grenade-launcher rounds.’ Sgt. Hester killed at least three 
insurgents . . . .”); MARGARET C. HARRELL ET AL., RAND NAT’L DEF. RESEARCH 
INST., ASSESSING THE ASSIGNMENT POLICY FOR ARMY WOMEN 32 (2007) 
(“[T]here are circumstances in which support units with women are in a rela-
tionship with maneuver units that is only very slightly different from being 
assigned, and . . . in some circumstances, they have a closer relationship with 
the maneuver unit than with the unit in their assigned chain of command.”); 
JAMES E. WISE JR. & SCOTT BARON, WOMEN AT WAR: IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND 
OTHER CONFLICTS, at ix (2006) (“Servicewomen are frequently engaged in fire-
fights with enemy insurgents while guarding convoys, traveling in hostile ter-
ritory, or performing military police duties and other vital support functions.”). 
 226. See Statistical Info. Analysis Div., Dep’t of Def., Operation Iraqi Free-
dom Military Deaths March 19, 2003 Through October 4, 2008, at 1 (on file 
with author). 
 227. Progress of the Iraqi Security Forces: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Armed Services, 109th Cong. 53 (2007) (statement of General George W. Ca-
sey, Jr., Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq, U.S. Army). 
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vices Committee when nominated in 2006 to be Assistant Sec-
retary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs “that 
women have been and will continue to be an integral part of the 
Army team, performing exceptionally well in all specialties and 
positions open to them.”228 Many officials have also linked 
women’s expanded military role to national commitments to sex 
equality. For example, Representative Susan Davis in 2005 en-
dorsed the claims of servicewomen who stressed “that women 
have the right, as well as the responsibility, to serve.”229 Davis 
elaborated, quoting a female Marine veteran: “‘Women’s strug-
gle for a place in the military has been about seeking the full 
rights and responsibilities of citizenship. The struggle is about 
women being judged by the same standards as men in any job 
for which they can qualify. It has always been about being able 
to pursue a career based on individual qualifications rather 
than unrelated stereotypes.’”230 
Survey data suggests that popular support for women’s 
military service, including in combat, has also increased since 
Rostker. In 1979 and 1980—the years surrounding the debate 
over Carter’s proposal—surveys found that approximately half 
the population supported registering women and subjecting 
them to conscription, and approximately one-fifth to one-
quarter of the population supported making women eligible for 
combat positions.231 Opposition to drafting women may have 
 
 228. Nominations Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Second 
Session, 109th Congress: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 
109th Cong. 487 (2007) (statement of Ronald J. James, to be Assistant Secre-
tary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs). 
 229. Progress of the Iraqi Security Forces: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Armed Services, supra note 227, at 54 (statement of Representative Susan Da-
vis). 
 230. 151 CONG. REC. H4015 (daily ed. May 25, 2005) (statement of Repre-
sentative Susan Davis) (quoting Sergeant Cynthia Hanna, Marine veteran). 
 231. In a Gallup survey conducted between March 2 and 5, 1979, fifty per-
cent favored registering women and forty-three percent stated that women 
should be conscripted if a draft became necessary. Of the forty-three percent 
who favored drafting women, nineteen percent stated that women should be 
eligible for combat roles and twenty-two percent stated that women should be 
ineligible. See GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1979, 
at 150–53 (1980). On February 1 to 4, 1980, fifty-six percent favored register-
ing women and fifty-one percent stated that women should be conscripted if a 
draft became necessary. Of the fifty-one percent who favored drafting women, 
twenty-one percent stated that women should be eligible for combat roles and 
twenty-eight percent stated that women should be ineligible. See GEORGE H. 
GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1980, at 54–56, 58 (1981). On 
July 11 to 14, 1980, forty-nine percent favored registering women and forty-
nine percent stated that women should be conscripted if a draft became neces-
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increased slightly in Rostker ’s immediate wake.232 But in 1990, 
1991, and 1992—before, during, and after the Gulf War that 
helped spur the laws eliminating statutory combat exclusions—
surveys found dramatically increased levels of public support 
for women in combat, with that position almost always attract-
ing over half the population and sometimes significantly more 
than that. A New York Times/CBS News poll surveying 1557 
adults nationwide between January 13 and 15, 1990 found that 
seventy-two percent stated that “‘women members of the armed 
forces should be allowed to serve in combat units if they want 
to.’”233 In a Gallup poll conducted between August 30 and Sep-
tember 2, 1990, sixty percent stated that “women in the U.S. 
military” should “serve in actual combat roles if it becomes ne-
cessary in the current situation in the Mideast.”234 A Gallup 
poll conducted between February 14 and 17, 1991 found that 
thirty-eight percent stated that they “favor[ed] changing U.S. 
policy in order to allow women to serve in combat roles.”235 A 
Newsweek/Gallup poll surveying 610 adults on July 25 and 26, 
1991 found that fifty-three percent stated that servicewomen 
should receive combat assignments if they want them and an 
additional twenty-six percent stated that servicewomen should 
receive combat assignments on the same terms as men.236 Res-
 
sary. Of the forty-nine percent who favored drafting women, twenty-two per-
cent stated that women should be eligible for combat roles and twenty-five 
percent stated that women should be ineligible. See id. at 146–49. Between 
January 31 and February 4, 1980, the ABC News-Harris Survey polled a na-
tionwide cross section of 1198 likely voters. Fifty-five percent favored register-
ing women and making them eligible for conscription. Twenty-nine percent 
favored assigning servicewomen to combat units. See Louis Harris, Americans 
Favor Military Registration of Young People, ABC NEWS-HARRIS SURV., Mar. 
7, 1980, at 1, 2–3. 
 232. A Gallup survey conducted between July 31 and August 3, 1981 asked 
respondents whether they “approve[d] or disapprove[d] of the Supreme Court 
ruling that women cannot be drafted.” Of course, this question did not accu-
rately describe the Rostker holding. Rostker did not prevent Congress from 
drafting women; it held that Congress was constitutionally free to choose 
male-only registration and conscription instead. Nonetheless, fifty-nine per-
cent of respondents reported that they approved of the “ruling that women 
cannot be drafted.” GEORGE H. GALLUP, THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 
1981, at 181–82 (1982) (emphasis omitted). 
 233. Elaine Sciolino, Battle Lines Are Shifting on Women in War, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 1990, at A1, D23. 
 234. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1990, at 
114, 117 (1991) (emphasis omitted). 
 235. GEORGE GALLUP, JR., THE GALLUP POLL: PUBLIC OPINION 1991, at 
59–60 (1992) (emphasis omitted). 
 236. See Opinion Watch: On the Front Lines?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 1991, at 
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pondents were also asked whether allowing women to serve in 
combat roles would benefit or burden the military. Sixty-three 
percent thought the military would benefit from allowing wom-
en to serve as jet fighter pilots, fifty-nine percent thought the 
military would benefit from allowing women to serve on Navy 
warships, and forty-one percent thought the military would 
benefit from allowing women to serve as infantry soldiers.237 
Fifty percent supported including women in conscription if a 
draft became necessary.238 A Gallup survey conducted on No-
vember 10 and 11, 1992 found that fifty-five percent favored 
“[a]llowing women in the military into combat jobs.”239 A 1992 
Roper Organization survey of fifteen hundred representative 
adults found that fifty-three percent favored allowing women to 
serve on combat aircraft, fifty-one percent favored allowing 
women to serve on combat ships, and forty-five percent favored 
allowing women to serve in direct ground combat positions. Fif-
ty-two percent favored making women eligible for conscrip-
tion.240 
More recent surveys have found similarly widespread, if 
not greater, support for women’s military service, including in 
combat. A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted between 
June 5 and 7, 1998 found that fifty-four percent supported in-
cluding women in conscription if a draft became necessary.241 A 
CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll conducted between December 14 
and 16, 2001 found that seventy-seven percent favored women 
“[f]lying combat aircraft,” seventy-three percent favored women 
“[s]erving on submarines,” sixty-three percent favored women 
“[s]erving as Special Forces that conduct operations behind 
enemy lines,” and fifty-two percent favored women “[s]erving as 
ground combat troops.” Forty-six percent favored including 
women in conscription if a draft became necessary.242 
Popular support for women’s military service, including in 
combat, has remained strong during the Iraq War. A CNN/USA 
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Today/Gallup poll conducted between May 20 and 22, 2005 
found that, even amidst a bloody and extended conflict, forty-
four percent of the 1,006 surveyed adults favored women “‘serv-
ing as ground troops who are doing most of the fighting.’”243 
In sum, the evidence indicates a marked positive shift in 
congressional, executive, military, and popular support for 
women’s military service, including in combat. Despite Rost-
ker ’s judgment that restrictions on women’s military service 
did not threaten women’s equal rights, extrajudicial forces—
driven by the combination of their commitment to sex equality 
 
 243. Darren K. Carlson, Do Americans Give Women a Fighting Chance?: 
Service Other than Active Combat OK with Americans, in THE GALLUP POLL: 
PUBLIC OPINION 2005, at 217, 217–18 (Alec M. Gallup & Frank Newport eds., 
2007). James Webb’s career also suggests the popular opinion shift since Rost-
ker. In 1979, Webb felt comfortable publishing an article opposing women’s 
participation in combat and criticizing Congress’s decision to admit women to 
the military academies. See James Webb, Women Can’t Fight, WASHINGTO-
NIAN, Nov. 1979, at 144, 146 (“There is a place for women in our military, but 
not in combat. And their presence at institutions dedicated to the preparation 
of men for combat command is poisoning that preparation.”). Webb’s article 
was not universally popular, but did not prevent Webb from becoming Secre-
tary of the Navy from 1987 to 1988. See Nominations Before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, First Session, 100th Congress: Hearings Before the S. 
Comm. on Armed Services, 100th Cong. 49–93 (1988); John H. Cushman Jr., 
Navy Chief Quits, Assailing Carlucci over Budget Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 
1988, at A1. When Webb campaigned in 2006 to become a United States Sena-
tor from Virginia, however, his 1979 article became a significant campaign is-
sue, with Webb’s opponent, George Allen, mailing fliers to voters warning 
that: “‘If James Webb had his way, . . . we’d send women back to a time when 
they weren’t respected, and weren’t treated fairly — and we certainly wouldn’t 
have women studying at the military academies.’” Michael D. Shear, Hip-High 
in Mud, Allen, Webb Show No Signs of Letting up, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2006, 
at B6. In response, Webb distanced himself from his own publication, either 
because he no longer believed what he had written, or because he realized that 
opposing the expansion of women’s military role was now outside the main-
stream of popular opinion and hence a political liability, or both. In September 
2006, Webb declared he was “fully comfortable with the roles of women in the 
military today.” Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept. 17, 2006) 
(transcript at 12, on file with author) (statement of James Webb). 
Interestingly, Allen had fought the admission of women to the Virginia 
Military Institute (VMI), a state military college. While Governor of Virginia 
in 1995, he criticized “the federal government,” which was litigating to win 
women’s admission to VMI, for “its efforts to ruin VMI for whatever social 
cause.” Allen explained that “if VMI admitted women, it wouldn’t be the VMI 
that we’ve known for 154 years. You just don’t treat women the way you treat 
fellow cadets. If you did, it would be ungentlemanly, it’d be improper.” “Live” 
with TAE: George Allen, AM. ENTERPRISE, Mar./Apr. 1995, at 23, 24. During 
the 2006 Senate campaign, Allen also distanced himself from his earlier posi-
tion, stating that he had been “wrong” to think women’s admission would ruin 
VMI. Meet the Press, supra, at 14 (statement of Senator George Allen). Webb 
won the election. 
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and their recognition of the volunteer military’s personnel 
needs—have dramatically expanded women’s military role, in-
cluding in combat. 
B. ROSTKER IN LIGHT OF THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CHANGES IN 
WOMEN’S MILITARY STATUS 
The record of women’s legal status in the military since 
Rostker illustrates how the constitutional interpretation in a 
Supreme Court decision can become much less compelling and 
convincing over time, without any constitutional amendment or 
reversal in the Court’s jurisprudence. The Court has not over-
ruled or questioned Rostker, and lower courts have not chal-
lenged the decision. In addition, none of the extrajudicial 
changes in women’s military role formally contravene Rostker, 
which imposed no prohibitions on Congress, the executive, or 
the military. But the extrajudicial transformation in women’s 
military status has nonetheless seriously undermined Rostker ’s 
foundation because Rostker ’s reasoning, premises, and expecta-
tions do not match how the nation has evolved.244 The congres-
sional, executive, and military officials who undertook this 
transformation, moreover, realized that their actions threat-
ened Rostker. These extrajudicial actors have enforced their 
own judgments about sex equality, recognizing that their 
judgments may be codified in a judicial decision that demands 
still further expansion of women’s military role in the form of 
sex-neutral rules governing registration, conscription, and 
combat. 
Extrajudicial developments have undercut Rostker ’s fac-
tual premises. Rostker relied on women’s absence from combat 
service, and on political and popular opposition to women’s 
combat service. Today, it is much harder to assert that there is 
strong governmental and popular opposition to women serving 
in combat. Public support for women’s military service, includ-
ing in combat, has steadily increased. Congress has eliminated 
statutory combat exclusions, and military regulations have 
 
 244. Rostker is not unique in grounding its constitutional interpretation on 
factual and cultural premises that can become less plausible over time. To 
some degree, the Court may inevitably base its interpretation of constitutional 
equal protection on its understanding of “the facts of life.” Charles L. Black, 
Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 427 (1960). 
Sometimes the Court’s understanding of the world stands the test of time, and 
sometimes it does not. For a notorious example, compare Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954), with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 
(1896). 
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opened many combat roles to women, including almost all mili-
tary positions except those officially identified as primarily in-
volving direct ground combat. Even with women’s official exclu-
sion from direct ground combat, moreover, the military is 
structured so that some women will be predictably involved in 
direct ground combat.245 
Extrajudicial change has also undermined Rostker ’s cul-
tural assumptions. Rostker accepted political and popular oppo-
sition to women’s combat service as too commonsensical to be 
explained. In fact, this opposition was intent on preserving con-
straints on women’s public roles out of the belief that women’s 
real responsibilities were domestic. Today, Rostker ’s ingrained 
cultural assumptions do not resonate with the assurance of 
common sense. Growing segments of the government and pub-
lic appear to have abandoned the notion that women have spe-
cial familial responsibilities incompatible with military service, 
especially in combat. Indeed, such notions are now widely un-
derstood to be one of the cultural premises undermining sex 
equality. Congress cited its determination to recognize women’s 
equal rights in eliminating statutory combat exclusions, and 
the military has expressed similar commitments to sex equality 
in dramatically expanding women’s combat service.246 
The extrajudicial changes in women’s military status have 
undercut Rostker ’s central factual and cultural assumptions. 
These extrajudicial developments make clear that Rostker is 
inconsistent with the rest of the Court’s sex discrimination ju-
risprudence, even if the Court may be reluctant to acknowledge 
the inconsistency and require sex-neutral rules for military 
service before legislation and military regulations impose them. 
The Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence holds that 
the state cannot exclude all women from a position open to men 
on the ground that many or most women may be unable or un-
willing to satisfy that position’s requirements. In other words, 
the state cannot treat women who are similar to men in inter-
ests and abilities as if they are different just because they are 
women. For instance, United States v. Virginia247 held that the 
Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a state military college, could 
not exclude all women even if most women were uninterested 
in, or unable to complete, VMI’s program. Instead, VMI had to 
assess each individual applicant’s qualifications. “State actors 
 
 245. See supra note 225. 
 246. See supra Part III.A. 
 247. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
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controlling gates to opportunity,” the Court explained, “may not 
exclude qualified individuals based on ‘fixed notions concerning 
the roles and abilities of males and females.’”248 
“[G]eneralizations about ‘the way women are,’ estimates of 
what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying 
opportunity to women whose talent and capacity place them 
outside the average description.”249 In this case, women have 
now served in a wide range of combat positions with a success 
that would have been unimaginable to most Americans in the 
1970s and early 1980s, and it is apparent that some women 
could fill all military roles. 
The Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence also holds 
that the state cannot use sex-based distinctions to expand dif-
ferences between men and women by enhancing men’s status 
and undermining women’s. The Court has explained that its 
sex discrimination jurisprudence is designed to end women’s 
“legal, social, and economic inferiority” and give women “full ci-
tizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, partic-
ipate in and contribute to society based on their individual tal-
ents and capacities.”250 Military service has long established 
and confirmed men’s full citizenship, while political and popu-
lar commitments to limiting women’s military role—including 
Congress’s 1980 decision to exclude women from registration—
have been closely intertwined with the notion that women’s 
private duties preclude their equal participation in public life. 
The Court’s sex discrimination jurisprudence rejects sex-based 
state action that undercuts women’s equal citizenship. 
In sum, the transformation in women’s military role has 
undermined Rostker ’s continued plausibility as constitutional 
interpretation. The congressional, executive, and military offi-
cials who pursued this transformation, moreover, realized they 
might be stripping Rostker ’s foundation, and nonetheless con-
tinued to expand women’s military role, including in combat. 
Congressional supporters of eliminating statutory combat ex-
clusions were acutely aware that their conduct might undercut 
Rostker. Responding to their critics’ warnings,251 Senators Wil-
 
 248. Id. at 541 (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 
(1982)). 
 249. Id. at 550. 
 250. Id. at 534, 532. For more discussion of this aspect of the Court’s sex 
discrimination jurisprudence, see Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Prac-
tice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case Study of Sex-Segregated Public 
Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 771–73 (2002). 
 251. Senators John Glenn and Sam Nunn opposed narrowing the statutory 
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liam Roth and Edward Kennedy, authors of the 1991 law nar-
rowing statutory combat exclusions, repeatedly addressed the 
argument that the law would “result in women being required 
to register for the draft and women being subject to the 
draft.”252 Yet Congress proceeded anyway to reduce and then 
remove all statutory combat exclusions. Congress and the ex-
ecutive have simply asked the Defense Department to monitor 
whether extrajudicial changes in women’s military status are 
weakening Rostker ’s foundation.253 
 
combat exclusions in 1991 on the ground that repealing “current combat ex-
clusion laws” might negatively impact “the constitutionality of the male only 
registration and service requirements of the Military Selective Service Act.” 
137 CONG. REC. 20,715 (1991) (statement of Senator John Glenn); see also id. 
at 20,728 (statement of Senator Sam Nunn) (similar). Senator John McCain 
explained that Rostker “clearly stated that the reason the Supreme Court of 
the United States upheld the law that required males to register at age 18, 
and did not require females, was because of the combat exclusionary laws that 
had already been put on the books.” He warned that narrowing the statutory 
combat exclusions would mean that “we may well have to register women for 
the draft when they turn age 18.” Id. at 20,718 (statement of Senator John 
McCain). After Congress enacted the 1991 statute, Representative Robert 
Dornan stressed that “there is no way the Supreme Court or any court in the 
land is going to say once women are in combat, they are going to be exempt 
from the draft.” Gender Discrimination in the Military: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Military Personnel and Compensation and the Defense Policy 
Panel of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, supra note 194, at 110 (statement of 
Representative Robert Dornan). Representative Jon Kyl advocated the 1992 
recommendation of the Commission on the Assignment of Women in the 
Armed Forces that Congress enact, for the first time, a statutory prohibition 
barring women from ground combat. See Women in Combat: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Military Forces and Personnel of the H. Comm. on Armed 
Services, supra note 205, at 42–44 (statement of Representative Jon Kyl). The 
Commission had argued that such a prohibition would preserve “the justifica-
tion used by the Supreme Court to uphold the constitutionality of the all-male 
draft.” THE PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF WOMEN IN THE 
ARMED FORCES, supra note 188, at 26. Kyl agreed that Congress needed “to 
ensure that a legal distinction exists between the role of men and women, thus 
to justify a policy of non-conscription of women.” Women in Combat: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Military Forces and Personnel of the H. Comm. on 
Armed Services, supra note 205, at 43 (statement of Representative Jon Kyl). 
 252. 137 CONG. REC. 20,722 (1991) (statement of Senator William Roth); 
see also id. at 20,733 (statement of Senator William Roth); id. at 20,714; 
20,721; 20,733 (statement of Senator Edward Kennedy). 
 253. The 1993 statute that eliminated the last statutory combat exclusion 
required the Defense Secretary to provide Congress with ninety days of notice 
before assigning women “to units and positions whose mission requires routine 
engagement in direct combat on the ground.” The statute specified that the 
Defense Secretary’s report notifying Congress had to include “a detailed anal-
ysis of [the] legal implication of the proposed change with respect to the consti-
tutionality of the application of the Military Selective Service Act to males on-
ly.” National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 
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IV.  WOMEN’S LEGAL STATUS IN THE MILITARY AND 
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE  
Extrajudicial developments have had a devastating impact 
on Rostker ’s viability. But the most pressing issue this record 
raises is how to understand the transformation in women’s mil-
itary role that has taken place outside the courts since Rostker. 
One immediate question is whether to understand this 
transformation as constitutional change. There is a developing 
legal literature on extrajudicial constitutionalism. But this lite-
rature has focused on the existence or exercise of the courts’ 
power to strike down or restrict government action, and on how 
extrajudicial institutions can, should, or do resist exertions of 
that power. Scholars have opposed the courts’ power to find 
laws unconstitutional through judicial review.254 They have 
challenged Court rulings limiting Congress’s authority to enact 
legislation under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.255 They have advanced the “departmentalist” view that 
 
103-160, § 542(b), 107 Stat. 1547, 1660 (1993). In May 1994, President Bill 
Clinton directed the Defense Secretary to “continue to review the arguments 
for and against continuing to exclude women from registration now that they 
can be assigned to combat roles other than ground combat.” Letter from Bill 
Clinton, President, to Thomas S. Foley, Speaker, House of Representatives 
(May 18, 1994), reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. 15,545 (1994); Letter from Bill 
Clinton, President, to Albert Gore, Jr., President, Senate (May 18, 1994), re-
printed in 140 CONG. REC. 15,547 (1994) (same). The Defense Department’s 
November 1994 report concluded “that the restriction of females from assign-
ments below the brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct 
combat on the ground, provides justification for exempting women from regis-
tration as set forth in the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Rostker v. 
Goldberg.” However, the report noted that “[b]ecause of th[e] change in the 
makeup of the Armed Forces”—specifically “the significant increase” in mili-
tary dependence on women “due to their increased combat and combat support 
roles”—“much of the congressional debate which, in the court’s opinion, pro-
vided adequate congressional scrutiny of the issue 15 years ago, would be in-
appropriate today.” Dep’t of Def., Peacetime Draft Registration and the Selec-
tive Service System (SSS) 2 (Nov. 16, 1994) (on file with author). The National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, in turn, altered the congres-
sional notification requirements from the 1993 statute. See National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, § 541(a)(1), 119 
Stat. 3136, 3251–52 (2006). But the Defense Secretary’s report providing Con-
gress with notice of a decision to change the military’s “ground combat exclu-
sion policy” is still required to include “a detailed analysis of [the] legal impli-
cation of the proposed change with respect to the constitutionality of the 
application of the Military Selective Service Act (50 App. U.S.C. 451 et seq.) to 
males only.” Id. 
 254. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE 
COURTS 52 (1999); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 15 (1999). 
 255. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism 
and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical 
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the President and Congress have the right to disregard the Su-
preme Court’s constitutional interpretation,256 or even its reso-
lution of specific cases,257 in order to proceed contrary to Court 
instruction. They have made the “popular constitutionalist” 
case that the public has the power to overturn the Court’s con-
stitutional interpretation.258 
Rostker upheld and placed no constraints upon government 
action. Yet the striking extrajudicial transformation in women’s 
military status is at odds with Rostker ’s reasoning, premises, 
and expectations. This transformation highlights a question on 
which the literature about extrajudicial constitutional change 
has not adequately focused: what counts as constitutional 
change outside the courts? The record of women’s military sta-
tus illustrates how the answer to that question depends on the 
purposes for which the question is being asked. 
The transformation in women’s military role since Rostker 
clearly does not count as constitutional change if the question 
is meant to determine whether courts would have required this 
transformation if Congress, the executive, and the military had 
not acted. Rostker placed no pressure on Congress, the execu-
tive, or the military to alter women’s military role. The opinion 
upheld male-only registration, endorsed male-only conscription 
and combat, and appeared to permit any form of sex-based dis-
tinction in military service, including women’s complete exclu-
sion. If extrajudicial actors had not spent the years since Rost-
ker transforming women’s military status, moreover, Rostker ’s 
foundation would be no weaker today than when announced. 
The transformation in women’s military role since Rostker 
also does not count as constitutional change if the question is 
meant to determine whether Congress, the executive, and the 
military stated after Rostker that they were constitutionally ob-
ligated to make the changes in women’s military status that 
they enacted. These extrajudicial actors have not contended 
that they were required to act. This is unsurprising. It is not 
clear how often Congress, the executive, or the military ever 
 
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1952–80 (2003). 
 256. See, e.g., John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive 
Branches in Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 371 
(1988); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Consti-
tutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1270–71 (1996). 
 257. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221–22 (1994). 
 258. See LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 253 (2004). 
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reason in terms of an affirmative constitutional obligation upon 
them. Indeed, the notion that specific actions are required to 
remedy specific constitutional violations—common when a 
court must decide the specific case before it—might be in some 
tension with the incremental process, marked by compromise, 
that Congress, the executive, and the military often employ, 
and that they used to expand servicewomen’s role. 
However, the transformation in women’s military role 
since Rostker does count as constitutional change if one is try-
ing to understand the basic normative commitments that shape 
the meaning of constitutional equal protection as it evolves. 
This transformation has made modes of structuring women’s 
military service that were once widely accepted as right, rea-
sonable, and equitable, now appear wrong and invidious. In the 
governmental and popular debates over women’s military role 
that raged in the 1970s and early 1980s, even many people de-
termined to establish sex equality in constitutional and statu-
tory law believed that Congress and the military should organ-
ize women’s military service to protect the primacy of women’s 
domestic obligations and should exclude women from combat 
positions. Rostker ’s interpretation of equal protection reflected 
that contemporaneous understanding of sex equality, and the 
courts’ jurisprudence on women’s military service has remained 
static since. From the standpoint of constitutional principle, 
this view of constitutional equal protection may have been 
wrong from the moment of its conception because it treated 
women as less than full citizens, and denied women equal 
access to the benefits and burdens of military service simply 
because of sex. But as a functional matter, what constitutional 
equal protection means in practice at any given point in history 
tends to reflect and respond to widespread, evolving under-
standings of the requirements and implications of equality. 
From the early 1990s to the present, Congress, the executive, 
the military, and the public have increasingly come to believe 
that the conception of women’s military role dominant as re-
cently as the early 1980s is inconsistent with their commit-
ments to sex equality, and they have expanded women’s mili-
tary service, including in combat. Over time, this shift in 
perspective is likely to lead people to make different claims for 
change and to shape judgments about how the Constitution’s 
open-textured language of equal protection applies to specific 
questions about women’s legal status in the military. More as-
pects of women’s military status are likely to be scrutinized for 
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their consistency with constitutional norms of equal protection, 
challenged as unconstitutional, and changed in the interest of 
sex equality. 
Courts are one place this shift in perspective might regis-
ter. But at least in the short term, they are probably not the 
most important place. Extrajudicial changes in women’s mili-
tary role have undermined Rostker ’s foundation. Where Rostker 
assumed that women’s exclusion from combat was too common-
sensical to require explanation, male-only combat positions now 
need justification and appear constitutionally vulnerable be-
cause women’s combat service is widely accepted as reasonable. 
However, courts typically have not been prominent agents of 
change in the military context, where the judiciary’s symbolic 
authority is relatively low. For example, courts have not led ef-
forts to equalize military opportunities, for African-
Americans,259 gay people,260 religious minorities,261 or women. 
 
 259. Six years before Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 
President Harry Truman’s executive order “declared [it] to be the policy of the 
President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all per-
sons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national 
origin.” Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722, 722 (1943–1948). By October 
1953, ninety-five percent of black Army soldiers were in integrated units, 
largely because of Army field commanders’ actions during the Korean War. 
See RICHARD M. DALFIUME, DESEGREGATION OF THE U.S. ARMED FORCES: 
FIGHTING ON TWO FRONTS, 1939–1953, at 218–19 (1969). The author of the 
first book on military integration later reported that Supreme Court Justices 
read his manuscript before issuing Brown. See id. at 4 & n.4. 
 260. The “Don’t Ask/Don’t Tell” policy that the Clinton Administration, 
Congress, and the military negotiated in 1993 currently governs the military 
service of gay people. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1670–73 (1993) (codified at 
10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006)). This policy does not accord gay people equal rights, 
and thus represented a significant compromise for Clinton, who had initially 
planned to sign “an Executive order ending discrimination on the basis of sex-
ual orientation in determining who may serve in the Armed Forces.” William 
J. Clinton, Memorandum on Ending Discrimination in the Armed Forces, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 23, 23 (Jan. 29, 1993). Nonetheless, Clinton understood Don’t 
Ask/Don’t Tell to be “a substantial advance over” previous military policy per-
mitting questions “about sexual orientation in the enlistment procedure.” Wil-
liam J. Clinton, Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Homosexuals in the 
Military, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1109, 1111 (July 19, 1993). The policy change was not 
made under judicial pressure; courts had consistently upheld military policies 
discriminating against gay servicemembers. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 
881 F.2d 454, 460–61, 464–65 (7th Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 
F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Rich v. Sec’y of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 
1229 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 261. In 1987, Congress recognized the right of uniformed military person-
nel to wear an item of religious apparel that does not interfere with military 
duties, and is neat and conservative. See National Defense Authorization Act 
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Constitutional rights in this arena have frequently been unde-
renforced judicially, relying instead on political enforcement for 
their vindication.262 
The shift in perspective is likely to be most important, at 
least in the near term, in shaping the constitutional arguments 
that can be made to Congress, the executive, and the military. 
For instance, a court would probably be unwilling to find a 
male-only combat position inconsistent with equal protection, 
at least in the short term. This judicial nonintervention leaves 
extrajudicial actors with more freedom and less clarity than 
they would have if operating under judicial constraint. But 
even without judicial action, the extrajudicial shift in perspec-
tive on women’s military service has altered the constitutional 
landscape that Congress, the executive, and the military con-
front, empowering certain constitutional arguments, rendering 
certain questions about constitutionality more reasonable, and 
making some paths more difficult and others easier to pursue. 
The argument that a male-only combat position should be 
opened to women to help vindicate constitutional principles of 
equal protection has become a perfectly cogent, even powerful 
claim to advance before Congress, the executive, and the mili-
tary. In contrast, for example, it has become much more diffi-
cult to argue that removing women entirely from combat ser-
vice would be consistent with constitutional equal protection, 
making Congress, the executive, and the military less likely to 
initiate action in that direction and less likely to succeed if they 
do. 
Extrajudicial actors, rather than courts, may answer the 
many questions that women’s military status raises from the 
perspective of the constitutional law of sex equality. Over the 
next decade or so—as changes in women’s military role contin-
ue to destabilize understandings of what, if any, limits on 
women’s military service are consistent with constitutional 
norms of sex equality—numerous issues are likely to become 
 
for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, § 508(a)(2), 101 Stat. 
1019, 1086–87 (1987) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2006)). This law reversed a 
Supreme Court decision upholding an air force prohibition on wearing a yar-
mulke while in uniform. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 504 (1986). 
 262. Cf. LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE 6 (2004) (discussing judicial underen-
forcement of “[t]he right to minimum welfare and the obligation to reform 
structurally entrenched social bias”); ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITU-
TIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 30–44 (1994) 
(discussing judicial underenforcement of a Fourteenth Amendment right to 
government protection from private violence). 
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more prominent, revealing some of the practical consequences 
of the extrajudicial transformation in women’s military role. 
Women’s Exclusion from Registration and Conscription 
Eligibility. For instance, Congress, the executive, and the mili-
tary may have to reconsider whether male-only registration 
and conscription eligibility are consistent with constitutional 
norms of sex equality. Men seeking to share the burdens of mil-
itary service and women seeking recognition of their equal citi-
zenship are sure to challenge male-only registration and con-
scription vigorously if Congress ever seeks to reimpose a draft. 
Even in the absence of conscription, the filing of Schwartz indi-
cates some persistent interest from both men and women in 
contesting male-only registration. Without judicial action or 
constitutional amendment, which are both unlikely, extrajudi-
cial decisionmakers cannot be forced to act, and they may pre-
fer to avoid the issue of male-only registration and conscription 
while no draft is in place. But as Congress, the executive, the 
military, and the public increasingly recognize women’s mili-
tary service, including in combat, as a natural consequence of 
women’s equality, women’s exclusion from registration and the 
draft—and men’s responsibility for bearing this entire bur-
den—becomes harder for extrajudicial decisionmakers to de-
fend and sustain as consistent with constitutional equal protec-
tion. 
Male-Only Combat Positions. Congress, the executive, and 
the military will have to decide whether male-only combat posi-
tions are consistent with constitutional equal protection. Servi-
cewomen seeking greater opportunities for leadership and ad-
vancement, and their supporters within and outside 
government, are sure to press the issue. Again, extrajudicial 
decisionmakers cannot be forced to open all combat positions to 
women without judicial intervention, which is unlikely. Male-
only combat positions may persist, at least in the near future, 
because some members of Congress, the executive, the military, 
and the public remain resistant to placing women in positions 
whose officially designated primary mission is to engage in di-
rect ground combat. But the growing political and popular rec-
ognition that women’s combat service—including service in 
what is functionally direct ground combat—is a legitimate ex-
pression and reflection of women’s equality makes women’s ex-
clusion from some combat positions more difficult for Congress, 
the executive, and the military to justify and maintain as con-
sistent with constitutional norms of sex equality. 
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The Rationality of Which Military Positions Are Open to 
Women and Which Closed. If Congress, the executive, and the 
military determine, at least for the short term, that male-only 
military positions can be consistent with constitutional norms 
of sex equality, they will have to decide whether the reasons 
behind specific exclusions need more systematic scrutiny. The 
judiciary currently does not review the rationality of why cer-
tain military positions are open to women and other positions 
closed, and it is unlikely to do so in the near future. A judicial 
ruling that military policies are unconstitutionally irrational is 
improbable. Moreover, courts have held that servicemembers 
are not protected under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act,263 which requires an employer’s demonstration of business 
necessity before permitting a single-sex job.264 In fact, military 
service is almost the only arena of American life that remains 
outside Title VII’s commitment to enforce principles of equal 
protection in employment. The functional absence of even ra-
tionality review over military decisions to close positions to 
women means that servicewomen are deprived of the basic 
guarantees of reasoned decisionmaking based on legitimate cri-
teria that both women and men enjoy in the civilian employ-
ment arena, rendering servicewomen’s military opportunities 
more vulnerable and their ability to plan their military careers 
more tenuous. 
The extrajudicial shift in normative perspective on wom-
en’s military service, the growing practical recognition that 
women are capable of successful military service in roles un-
imaginable to most Americans in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
and the virtual absence of judicial review, combine to make a 
strong case that Congress, the executive, and the military 
should assume a heightened responsibility to review and over-
see military decisions about which positions are closed to wom-
en to ensure their rationality, freedom from bias, and consis-
tency with constitutional norms of sex equality. For instance, 
Congress could enact a statute specifying criteria and proce-
dures for the military to use in deciding which positions should 
be closed to women, and providing for greater congressional 
oversight of these military decisions in ways that explicitly in-
corporate commitments to constitutional norms of sex equality 
 
 263. See, e.g., Hodge v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 1997); Roper v. 
Dep’t of the Army, 832 F.2d 247, 248 (2d Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Alexander, 572 
F.2d 1219, 1224 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 264. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). 
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and concerns about bias. The executive could impose similar 
requirements and oversight procedures in reviewing military 
decisions. In turn, the military itself could adopt internal pro-
cedures that provide for more study, deliberation, and explana-
tion before making a decision to exclude women from a military 
position, and that explicitly take concerns about sex equality 
and bias into account. For example, the military presently ex-
cludes women from submarines on the ground that creating 
appropriate berthing and privacy arrangements would be too 
expensive.265 Expense is a rationally relevant criteria to consid-
er in deciding whether to open a position to women, but the 
extrajudicial shift in perspective on women’s military service 
strengthens the argument that the military, together with 
Congress and the executive, should engage in more deliberation 
about and provide more explanation of how much expense 
should be deemed to prohibit change that would otherwise be 
undertaken to serve constitutional principles of equal protec-
tion. The shift also pushes these extrajudicial actors to decide 
and explain whether cost-based rationales for exclusion should 
distinguish between existing and new equipment, so that the 
military would design new submarines to accommodate both 
sexes even if it did not retrofit submarines already built for all-
male crews. 
In the near term at least, the argument that Congress, the 
executive, and the military should institute such changes in re-
view and oversight in the interest of constitutional norms of sex 
equality may be even stronger and more compelling than the 
arguments for integrating all male-only combat positions and 
ending women’s exclusion from registration and draft eligibili-
ty. The changes in review and oversight would simply seek to 
ensure women’s rational access to service and to institutional-
ize the commitments to constitutional norms of sex equality 
that Congress, the executive, and the military have already re-
peatedly expressed and demonstrated in transforming women’s 
military role. 
Facially Sex-Neutral Obstacles to Women’s Equal Status in 
the Military. To date, discussion of women’s military status has 
centered on sex-based rules like women’s exclusion from regis-
tration, conscription eligibility, and some combat positions. 
That is unsurprising because these exclusions are important 
and increasingly anomalous as courts and legislatures have fo-
 
 265. See supra text accompanying note 222. 
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cused on explicitly sex-based rules, eliminating almost all state 
action that openly treats men and women differently. The Su-
preme Court automatically applies heightened scrutiny to state 
action that explicitly distinguishes based on sex.266 But it sub-
jects facially sex-neutral state action to heightened scrutiny on-
ly if the plaintiff can meet the exceedingly difficult burden of 
demonstrating that the action was adopted with the equivalent 
of malice, “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ 
its adverse effects upon” women or men.267 The Court has ex-
plained that addressing the threats that facially neutral state 
action can pose to equality is beyond the judiciary’s capacity 
because it would require too much change.268 
However, there is little reason to believe that eliminating 
only open and obvious sex-based distinctions would be suffi-
cient to give women equal opportunities, responsibilities, and 
status in the military. For example, military assignment poli-
cies for noncombat positions officially open to both sexes are 
currently structured in ways that reflect and reinforce sex stra-
tification in the civilian workplace. The Armed Services Voca-
tional Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) test, which the military uses 
to assign enlisted personnel, measures existing practical know-
ledge rather than just aptitude. One of the eight ASVAB test 
areas measures “knowledge of automotive maintenance and re-
pair, and wood and metal shop practices.” Another test area 
measures “knowledge of electrical current, circuits, devices, and 
electronic systems.”269 Upon enlistment, men are more likely 
than women to be knowledgeable about automotive repair, elec-
trical work, and other skilled trades, and so the military is 
more likely to assign men to positions involving and developing 
those skills—positions leading to relatively lucrative civilian 
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jobs.270 When the Government Accountability Office reviewed 
the military’s demographics in 2005, servicewomen constituted 
fifteen percent of the active Armed Forces. Yet women ac-
counted for just six percent of enlisted electrical/mechanical 
equipment repairers and seven percent of enlisted craftswork-
ers, compared to thirty-four percent of enlisted health care spe-
cialists and thirty-one percent of the enlisted personnel in func-
tional support and administration, which includes such 
stereotypical female tasks as secretarial work.271 
The explicitly sex-based distinctions in military service 
currently attract the most interest and concern. But over time, 
the extrajudicial shift in perspective on women’s military ser-
vice is likely to push nonjudicial decisionmakers to consider 
whether there are facially sex-neutral military policies, such as 
the structure of the ASVAB test, that they should revise to ad-
vance constitutional norms of sex equality. Here again, this 
extrajudicial shift, combined with the absence of judicial re-
view, make a strong case for heightened congressional, execu-
tive, and military oversight over facially neutral military poli-
cies that disproportionately hamper servicewomen’s 
opportunities, depriving women of options within the military 
and of training that is valuable in the civilian workplace. 
Congress, the executive, and the military do not share the 
Court’s institutional limitations and need not adopt the narrow 
focus that the Court has pursued in light of its capacities. 
These extrajudicial actors can continue to develop and enforce 
their own evolving understanding of how military service 
should be structured to be most consistent with constitutional 
norms of sex equality. 
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